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INTRODUCTION

There are few things which rouse people like a good turf war,
especially when the feud erupts between two neighbors who have
jointly worked a patch of ground for decades. As long as both
landowners trust that they labor in harmony, neither may know or
particularly care where the boundary lies. But once agreement on
the use of the property dissolves, and ill will sets in, apathy about
the border gives way to a consuming zeal for a fixed and favorable
dividing line. Renewing faded claims to the contested plot of land,
the estranged disputants covet the clearest badge of property ownership: power to exclude the other and sole dominion.'
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has just lost
a key battle for legal turf.2 The United States court of appeals vacated
the SEC's so-called "one-share, one-vote" rule, 3 thereby. dealing
federal law its third major setback in a boundary war dating back
to the 1960s. 4 The SEC's adversary is state corporation law, and
the disputed "property" is regulatory hegemony over corporate stock.
Victory for state law has earned it the usual prize of a territorial
conquest: power to oust federal securities law as an equal source of
influence over the shifting contours of stock ownership. States, not

the federal government, now have the decisive say on what it means
to own a share of stock in American corporations.

1. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13

CORNELL

L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) ("[T]he

essence of private property is always the right to exclude others.").

2. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
3. Voting Rights Listing Standard; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg.
26,376, 26,394 (1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. S 240.19c-4 (1990)).
4. See infra text and accompanying notes 112-21, 200-16 & 240-50 (discussing

Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (rejecting the application of Rule
lOb-5 to "short-form mergers" carried out under Delaware law); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (holding that Indiana's control share
acquisition statute was constitutional and not preempted by the Williams Act);
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting SEC authority
to regulate voting rights under S 240.19c(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)).
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For many decades the claims of federal securities law (as regulator of interstate commerce in stock) and state corporation law (as
prescriber of stock's substantive property rights) overlapped but
peacefully co-existed. 5 Recent events, 6 however, have severely
strained-if not shattered-this tacit accord on joint control. The
breakdown does more than highlight the vast degree to which these
two regimes intersect, significant as this is in revealing the scope of
the disputed legal terrain. It also exposes surprising disagreement
on the core question of what attributes attach to (and can be detached
from) corporate stock.
The latest skirmish-over the one-share, one-vote issue-can
only be understood as one manifestation of this deeper controversy,
a controversy with profound implications not only for the perennial
state-federal tug-of-war but also for the striking way in which corporate stock, the quintessential species of property in a capitalist
society, is now being redefined by state lawmakers. This reformation
touches more than shareholders, and implicates ideas and concerns
extending far beyond the blinkered field of corporate law.7 It signifies,
first, that legal power over the structural make-up of corporate securities rests not with the federal government but with states. It also
stunningly realigns power within corporations in a way that dramatically scales back the traditional voting and alienability prerogatives of the shareholding function."
These twin outcomes constitute nothing less than a major upheaval in contemporary corporate law in the United States. The
outcomes are all the more intriguing because they stand in marked
contrast to events unfolding in Western Europe. It is there that
twelve sovereign nations are relinquishing centuries of autonomy
over commercial affairs in quest of greater economic and political

5. See infra Part II.
6. The most notable event has been the response of state law to hostile
takeovers. See ifra notes 177-215 & 265-71 and accompanying text.
7. For a critique of contemporary corporate law's narrow focus on the
shareholder-manager relationship, see Coffee, Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Gor'enance
as a Multi-Payer Game, 78 Go. LJ. 1495 (1990); Johnson, The Dawarejudridary

and the Me ing of Corporate Life and CorporateLaw, 68 TEx. L. Rnv. 865 (1990).
8. The beneficiaries of state efforts to constrict shareholder claims on corporate activity are various enterprise-dependent noninvestor interests, including
management. See Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeorer Statutes,
87 MmcH. L. Rgv. 846, 848-51 (1989).
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unity 9 and, in doing so, are displaying special solicitude for the
interests of capital providers.10 The American trend of empowering

9. Adoption of the Single European Act of 1986, Feb. 28, 1986, 30 0. J.
Eur. Comm. (No. L 169) 1 (1987), represents an effort to revive and hasten the
process of European integration begun many years before. Treaty instituting the
European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 49
(Cmd. 455) 7, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 49 (Cmd. 455) 82, 298
U.N.T.S. 11; Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 49 (Cmd. 455) 225, 298 U.N.T.S. 1672. See
Riesenfeld, The Single European Act, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 371 (1990)
(discussing the Single European Act). Although the scope of economic unification
still remains controversial-e.g., whether and when a single currency will be usedeven greater debate will ensue as the issue of political unification is pursued. Compare
Kiefer, Kohl Looks to German, European Unity, The Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 4,
1990, at I ('More than ever, we're ready to transfer sovereign rights to the
European Community ....
We're working further on the goal that unites us with
our European friends-namely, the building of the United States of Europe."'
(quoting German Chancellor Helmut Kohl)) with Wolf, The Howe Resignation; Limits
Defined Precisely in Treaties That Underpin EC-Soverdgny, Fin. Times (London), Nov.
3, 1990, at 8 ("The EC cannot dissolve the national parliaments; but national
parliaments can revoke the treaties and dissolve the EC. Thus, national parliaments
remain sovereign.").
10. In December, 1989 the European Communities Council adopted a merger
control regulation aimed at facilitating governmental clearance of mergers having
a "Community dimension." Council Regulations (EEC) No. 4064-89, Dec. 21,
1989, 32 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 395) 1 (1989) (on the control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings). See Dc Smedt & Vandersanden, The EC Merger Control
Regulation, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 437 (1990) (describing the merger
regulation); Kennerley, Europe's Myriad Merger Rules, Fin. Times (London), Sept.
27, 1990, at 32 (critiquing merger regulation as not achieving the goal of "onestop" review of proposed mergers).
With specific regard to takeovers, in February, 1989 the European Commission
issued a Proposal for a 13th Council Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover and Other General Bids. 32 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 64) 8 (1989).
As with the merger control regulation, the aim of the directive is more uniform
regulation of cross-border hostile takeover bids. As of mid-1990, the proposed
directive is still before the European Parliament for an initial reading but has not
yet been placed on the agenda. See Greenbaum, Tender Offers in the European Community:
77Te Playing Field Shrinks, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 923 (1989) (describing and
discussing the proposed directive). See Godden, Threat of Takeover Directive, Fin. Times
(London), July 12, 1990, at 40 (critiquing the takeover directive by a former
Secretary to the British Takeover Panel). In May 1990, the European Commission
endorsed an initiative to limit use of "poison pill" takeover defenses. See Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH), May 24, 1990, at 8. A separate new directive on takeover
defenses is not expected. Instead, existing legislation, probably the already-proposed
directive on takeover bids, will be amended to limit deployment of various defense
measures. Id.
All of this regulatory activity is the result of a favorable opinion of acquisition
and takeover activity, a position summarized by Herr Martin Bangemann, the EC
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states to advance various noninvestor goals by demoting shareholders
is, therefore, not only apparently at odds with that in Europe, it
seems to represent a step back to the very political fractionalization
and imbedded social democratic practices Europe is moving to curtail.
This international dimension to corporate governance thus offers
an instructive comparative vantage point on the American turf clash.
But in a global economy it also raises another worrisome question:
"Who has it right, we or they?" Answering this question demands,
in turn, a fresh willingness to assess what fimancial, social, and
political interests are truly at stake in this furor over the evolving
property rights of corporate stock. It will not be resolved by curtly
ruling certain inquiries as out of order. Thus, a dogmatic clinging
to models of corporate affairs in which shareholders persist as the
centerpiece of analysis needlessly hives off the concerns of capital
providers from those of other corporate claimants." Tired accounts
of developments in state corporation law as representing the worst
in benighted parochialism, regulatory capture, 12 management entrenchment, and as blocking attainment of the loftier goals of investor
protection, market liquidity, efficiency in resource use, and international competitiveness, will also do little to advance debate on this
matter.
It is necessary to puncture key axioms of corporate orthodoxy
and probe beneath the surface allure of conventional claims about
the degenerate condition of state law. Nothing less than a re-examination of the linkage between the norm of shareholder preeminence and the realization of important social and economic goals
is in order.1 3 Doing so requires a frank appreciation that the many

Commissioner for Industry and the Internal Market: "Takeover bids should be

viewed in a positive light, in that they encourage the selection by market forces of
the most competitive companies, and the restructuring of European companies,
which is indispensable to meet international competition." Guilford, EC Ban on
Poison Pil Tactics, The Times (London), May 9, 1990, 5 2, at 1.

11. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 878-98.
12. For commentary on the political nature of state antitakeover statutes, see
Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statums, 86 MICH. L. Rzv. 1635 (1988); Butler,
Corporation-Specji Anti-Takrover Statuaes and the Markdetfor CorporateChater, 1988 WIS.
L. Rav. 365; Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Fcaomy, 1988
Wis. L. REv. 467; Macey & Miller, Toward an Intrest-Group T'eoiy of Ddaware
CorporateLaw, 65 Tax. L. Ray. 469 (1987); Romano, The Politica Economy of Takerer
Statutes, 73 VA. L. Rav. 111 (1987).

13. In a series of articles, this author and David Millon have sought to
question the tightness of the connection between shareholder primacy and various
social and economic goals. See Johnson, Corporate Takeoren and Corporations: Who0 Are
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entitlements customarily associated with corporate stock, such as
equal voting rights and unfettered alienability, are not inherent,
essential, and unalterable, but are deliberately constitutive, historically situated, provisional, and contestable. Accordingly, the various

incidents that together comprise corporate stock as we know it can
be legally unbundled, some to be retained while others are pruned
or discarded. At the close of the twentieth century, into which of
these categories should equal voting rights and other well-known
features of corporate stock be placed? And, as always in our system
of federalism, the companion issue of whether state or federal government should tackle such a foundational matter as the reformulation
of corporate stock, and toward what ends, must be confronted. These
are the rudimentary questions that lie behind discourse about corporation and securities law, a discourse which, in the end, is all
about public control of private capital. These questions are enormously vexing. It is best to make them explicit.
Part II of this article relates the way in which for years federal
and state law mutually and harmoniously regulated corporate stock.
Cooperation was possible not because the fabric of corporate stock
is innate and immutable, but because the regulatory objectives of
each regime were well-served by the particular aggregation of attributes then composing corporate stock. Part III describes the reasons
why cooperation broke down. It examines three issues spanning a
twenty-year period that denote both the crumbling of shared assumptions about the desirability of certain traits of corporate stock
and the gradual (but ultimately decisive) recognition that dominion
over the substantive features of corporate stock is securely lodged in

They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 781 (1986); Johnson, supra note 7; Johnson,
The Eventual Clash Between Judicialand Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct,

14J. Coax. L. 35 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson, Eventual Clash]; Johnson, State Takeover
Statutes: Constitutionality, Community and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEa L. REv. 1051 (1988);
Johnson & Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105 (1990) [hereinafter
Johnson & Millon, Case Beyond Time]; Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams

Act, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1862 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Misreading The
Williams Act]; Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87
MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989); Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation
Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 903 (1988); Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201 [hereinafter Millon, Theories of the Corporation]. For recent responses

to these articles, see Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revisited, 88 MiCH. L. REv. 120
(1989); Cox, The Indiana Experiment in CorporateLaw: A Critique, 24 VAL. U.L. REv.
185 (1990); Garfield, Evaluating State Anti-takeover Legislation: A Broad-Minded New
Approach to Corporation Law or "A Race to the Bottom"?, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
119.
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state rather than the federal government.' 4 The one-share, one-vote
decision is the culmination of this development.
Part IV of the article discusses how the settling of this long
struggle for sovereignty over corporate stock has now laid the groundwork for truly revisiting the normative issues that lurk behind (and
often are masked by) this jurisdictional conflict. It contends that the
very fact of struggle over warring notions of corporate stock reveals
the faint stirrings of a significant transformation in popular belief
and institutional practice in a distinctly mature capitalist economy.
The task of ascribing features to corporate stock is, in short, different
in a highly-developed society than elsewhere. We are not especially
well-equipped, either in institutional practices, nomenclature, or patterns of thought, for this task. But at least we can see that there is
not just one template with which common stock can be designed.
Therefore, neither historic conventions in our own society nor events
in less capitalistic societies, whether European or otherwise, are,
standing alone, a reliable measuring rod of, or blueprint for, these
changes. Instead, the challenge is to devise a strategy for addressing
the fabric of corporate stock under particular, and ever-changing,
social circumstances, and over the long haul. This strategy must be
sensitive both to the reality of renewed muscle-flexing by institutional
investors15 and to the rising expectations of non-investor claimants, 6
two deep trends destined for prolonged tension. The article concludes
that, on this score, continued deference to state authority is a better
strategy than federal preemption for prolonging debate over, and
coming to grips with, the possibilities and pitfalls associated with the
task of reconciling these competing demands on the corporate institution.
II.

COMMON GROUND

For the most part, state corporation law and federal securities
law operate in distinct realms and do not overlap. But in one critical
14. See cases cited supra note 4 (listing the seminal cases that have dealt federal
securities law major setbacks in control over stock ownership in America).
15. With the apparent demise of hostile takeovers in the United States,
institutional investors such as pension funds, banks and insurance companies are
asserting their views on matters of corporate governance with great vigor. See

Anderson & Bullitt, Institutional Activism-The Sharehlder Proposal and the Role of the
Institutional Shareholder in a Proxy Context in T
ovzms-Opzm iNo IN TnH NEv
ENVIRONmENT, ALI-ABA CounsE oF STUDY MATERIAs 171 (Nov. 29-30, 1990);
Dickson, Investors Wake Up to Their Power, Fin. Times (London), Dec. 3, 1990, at

18.
16. Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, 24 IND. L. REV.

-

(1991).
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area, i.e., oversight of the stockholding function, these two regulatory
schemes address the same subject matter. In a sense, stock is an
inhabitant of both regimes. Even here, however, state and federal
law have historically policed different dimensions of corporate stock
and each has done so in a way that respects and reinforces, rather
than competes or conflicts with, the efforts of the other. Among
other matters, for example, corporation law provides for the authorization, 1 7 issuance"' and redemption 9 of shares of capital stock.
21
It spells out the issues on which 20 and the procedures by which,
shareholders, directors, and officers are empowered to act. It also
delineates the steps to be followed for taking various unusual actions
such as amending articles of incorporation 22 or bylaws, 23 and con2
6
ducting a merger, 24 asset sale 25 or dissolution of the enterprise.
Much of this structural architecture is enabling rather than "regulatory" in its thrust. 2 None of it is dealt with in federal securities
law.
On the other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 mandates that
corporations disclose detailed information to prospective investors in
connection with the initial distribution of securities. 29 Likewise, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that companies with securities registered under its provisions periodically disclose material

17. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act (RMBCA) § 6.01 (1984).
18. Id. §§ 6.03, 6.20-.28.
19. Id. § 6.31.

20. See, e.g., id. §§ 7.28, 8.03 (election of directors by shareholders); § 8.40
(appointment of officers by directors); § 8.41 (duties of officers).
21. Id. §§ 7.20-.28 (shareholder voting procedures); §§ 8.20-.25 (actions by
the board); § 8.42 (conduct by officers).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§§ 10.01-.09.
§§ 10.20-.22.
5§ 11.01, 11.03-.07.
§ 12.02.
§§ 14.01-.33.

27. For a comprehensive treatment of the various rights, powers and duties
of shareholders, directors and officers in the modem corporation, see M. EISENBERO,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). See also R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
(1986).
28. See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461
(1989) (describing and normatively assessing what Professor Eisenberg calls "enabling," "suppletory," and "mandatory" corporate law rules).
29. Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1988). See, e.g., Form S-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.11 (1990); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (1990).
30. Companies must register securities with the SEC if the securities are to
be traded on a national securities exchange, Securities Exchange Act § 12(b), 15
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information to their shareholders . 3 As one part of that overarching
objective, the 1934 Act confers rule-making authority on the SEC
to regulate the solicitation of proxies. 32 Pursuant thereto, the SEC
has adopted Regulation 14A, 33 the heart of which is a specification
of the information to be furnished to security holders in connection
Nith a proxy solicitation. 34 Inasmuch as state law requires corporate
management to disseminate very little information to shareholders
on a regular basis,35 federal law strives to rectify this disparity in
knowledge about company affairs. It does so not to imbue shareholders with decision-making authority not otherwise conferred on
them under state law, but for the limited purpose of making the
exercise of such decisions as are assigned to shareholders under state
law better informed.

36

U.S.C. § 781(b) (1988), or if the corporation has 500 or more holders of a class
of equity securities and more than $5 million in assets. Securities Exchange Act
§ 12(g)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B) (1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 24 0 .12g-1
(1990)).
31. Corporations must file annual reports, Rule 13a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a1 (1990), and Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1990); quarterly reports, Rule
13a-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1990), and Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a
(1990); and current reports, Rule 13a-l1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1990), and
Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1990).
32. Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). Under Securities Exchange Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1988), Regulation 14C, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14c 1-7 (1990), and Schedule 140, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-101 (1990),
a corporation with securities registered under Securities Exchange Act S 12(g) must
distribute to its shareholders an information statement and an annual report in
connection with an annual meeting at which directors are to be elected, even if
the corporation's board of directors is not soliciting proxies.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to -14 (1990).
34. Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1990) and Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101 (1990). The federal proxy rules govern various other related matters
as well. See Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1484-85 nn.116-21 and accompanying text.
35. Delaware's corporate statute, for example, contains no provision requiring
annual distribution of financial information to shareholders. But see RMBCA 5 16.20.
Delaware does, however, provide shareholders with a right to inspect corporate
books and records. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
36. As stated in the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets: "The
keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities legislation is disclosure." Report
of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Professor Louis Loss has described
the theme of federal securities law thusly: "Then, too, them is the recurrent theme
throughout these statutes of disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure."
1 L. Loss, SEcuRTrrIS REGULATION 27 (3d ed. 1989). Se also Knauss, A Reappraisal
of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 614 (1964) ("This concern over a
free market was based on the theory that, giren ad&quat information, the laws of
supply and demand, combined with action by each purchaserfor his own best interest, would
establish a true market value for the security.") (emphasis added).
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Thus, from the earliest days of American corporation law, and
long before (and continuing after) passage of the federal securities
laws, state law was both the agency by which corporate stock was
authorized and issued, and the lawmaking instrument by which its
substantive property and governance attributes were prescribed. For
example, as a form of personal property, stock is, for the most part,
freely alienable. 37 Traditionally it can be purchased, sold, gifted,
pledged, bequeathed, and otherwise transferred.3 8 Moreover, the decision as to whether, when and to whom stock should be disposed
of is, absent prior agreement otherwise,3 9 solely that of the shareholder,4° and does not require the consent of the corporate enterprise
itself, the board of directors or other shareholders. All of this stems
from state law.

When federal securities laws were first adopted in the early
1930s, they neither endowed corporate stock with the attribute of
alienability nor embellished that feature. Federal law simply took
alienability as a given and built its own disclosure scheme upon it.
Accordingly, under the Securities Act of 1933, a prospective purchaser
of corporate stock must be given specified information by the issuing
corporation before stock is offered or sold to him in a distribution.4"
That act, however, says nothing about the characteristics of the stock
itself. Similarly, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, no person
buying or selling stock may commit fraud in connection with a
purchase or sale, 42 nor may various corporate "insiders" buy or sell
stock without the prior disclosure of material information. 43 The
statute is silent, however, about what attributes must occupy the

37. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONs 776 (1946).
38. Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Investment Securities provides
a set of rules governing rights and obligations of parties to stock transfers. U.C.C.
§ 8 (1977). Section 8-105 makes investment securities negotiable, but that attribute
is narrower than transferability, a state law property incident apparently assumed,
rather than conferred by, the Uniform Commercial Code.
39. BALLANTINE, supra note 37, at 775-80.
40. An exception not grounded on consent is the relatively unimportant case
of judicial limitations on transferring control blocks of stock to looters and others.
See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. 1941).
41. See supra note 29 (describing the applicable disclosure requirements under
the Securities Act of 1933).
42. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); Rule 10b5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
43. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961).
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stock. For all their notorious complexity, therefore, federal securities
laws regulate the disposition of corporate stock vrith a remarkable
singularity of focus:4 parties to purchase and sale transactions should
not be given materially false information or, in certain instances,
have material information withheld from them, lest the exercise of
their state-conferred power to purchase or dispose of corporate stock
be inadequately informed and poorly employed.
The cooperative and mutually reinforcing relationship of state
and federal law can easily be seen in the congruent treatment of
stock dispositions sketched above. State law originates and defines
the substantive features of the property to be transferred (including
the very feature of alienability) and federal law supplements (and so
honors) that regime by overlaying the further requirement that exercise of such capabilities be preceded by access to meaningful information. 45 This is not to say federal law does not significantly alter
the legal status and entitlements of the stockholder. But federal law
does so by complementing the constitutive provisions of state law,
not by displacing or dismantling those vital qualities. For federal
securities law, the deep historical premise of free alienability formed
an indispensable part of the state-drawn legal landscape against which
that momentous legislation was enacted in the early 1930s. This does
not, however, mean that the trait of alienability was inherently
44. This is not to deny that federal securities laws are complex, or that they
regulate many facets of the securities industry, including securities professionals and
self-regulatory organizations. My point is simply that with respect to the disposition
of securities, the regulatory philosophy of federal law is rather straightforward. &r
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Inretors, 70 VA. L.
Ray. 669 (1984).
45. This relationship of federal and state law is not atypical, but in fact is
common. It is well-known that federal law
is generally interstitial in its nature.... Federal legislation ... builds
upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting
them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in
short, against the background of the total corpusjuris of the states in much
the way that a state legislature acts against the background of the common
law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
H. HART & H. WEHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL Sys7Mt 435
(1953).

See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.. L. REy. 489,
526-27 nn.138-41 (1954) (giving examples of how federal law draws on, and sometimes assimilates, state law concepts and precepts). An instructive illustration is the
area of patent regulation. While the United States Constitution empowers Congress
to provide for the issuance of patents, state law "governs transfers of this federal
interest and contracts concerning it." Id. at 527. See Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270
U.S. 496, 510-11 (1926); American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241
U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
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immutable or politically inviolable; states themselves at any time
could truncate free disposition. Rather, it means that federal securities
law, unknown before 1933, had furnished none of the guiding principles by which the property attributes of corporate stock-indeed,
of the entire corporate milieu-had theretofore been fused. Consequently, the pre-understandings then supplied by state law were so
pervasive and ingrained into the regulatory subconsciousness as to
be virtually unnoticed. Thus, they went unspoken, unchallenged and
undisturbed.4 The world designed by state corporation and property
law was simply taken for granted.
Another pre-supposed feature of most common stock today is
voting rights on various issues. Unlike free alienability, however,
which was so historically imbedded as to seem indigenous to corporate

46. As with any assertion about the unimportance of various factors in forming
law, proof depends on the absence of those factors from the visible policy agenda.
A review of federal securities law legislative history reveals no congressional concern
about the alienability of corporate stock. Concern centered, instead, on various
species of fraud and the dearth of accessible financial information. See Knauss, supra
note 36, at 613-16.
A recent Supreme Court case commenting on the validity of an interpretive
approach finding significance in silence is Tafilin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990).
There, the issue was whether state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over claims
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Pub. L.
No. 91-452, tit. 9, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), as amended 18 U.S.C. S 1961-1968 (1982
& Supp. 1990). Without dissent, the Court held that concurrent jurisdiction existed.
One interpretive issue Justice O'Connor confronted was the significance of congressional silence on the issue of state court jurisdiction when it enacted RICO.
She commented on the meaningfulness of that silence as follows:
Our review of the legislative history, however, reveals no evidence that
Congress even considered the question of concurrent state court jurisdiction
over RICO claims, much less any suggestion that Congress affirmatively
intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction over such claims on the federal
courts. As the Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have
concluded, "[t]he legislative history contains no indication that Congress
ever expressly considered the question of concurrent jurisdiction; indeed,
as the principal draftsman of RICO has remarked, 'no one even thought
of the issue . . . ."' Petitioners nonetheless insist that if Congress had
considered the issue, it would have granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. This argument, however, is misplaced,
for even if we could reliably discern what Congress' intent might have
been had it considered the question, we are not at liberty to so speculate;
the fact that Congress did not even consider the issue readily disposes of
any argument that Congress unmistakably intended to divest state courts
of concurrent jurisdiction.
Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 796 (citations omitted). Likewise, as to stock alienability. By
failing to address the subject, Congress left it alone. It was left where it had always
been-in state hands.
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stock, by the 1930's corporate suffrage practices had undergone at

least two significant changes. The first transformation concerned the
question of whether voting power belonged to the shareholder or the
shares. Until the mid-nineteenth century, corporate suffrage was thought
to attach to the shareholder, rather than to the stock itself.4 7 Thus,
at common law each shareholder had one vote regardless of the
amount of stock owned.4 This predominate principle of "one person,
one vote" derived from partnership law and was grounded on the
belief that voice in corporate governance should be unrelated to one's
financial stake in a venture.4 9 In providing for weighted voting, early
corporate statutes began moving away from the concept of "one
person, one vote." By the turn of the twentieth century, the transition
was completed and the modern custom of "one share, one vote"
had become firmly established. 0
To understand historical (and cross-cultural) practices on the
voting rights subject is thus to appreciate that there is more than
one way to allocate voting power within a corporation. 51 Isomorphism
is not a part of corporate stock's ancestry. Moreover, notwithstanding
the widespread modern convention of ascribing one vote to each
share of common stock, corporation statutes have long permitted the
authorization and issuance of shares lacking voting rights altogether
as well as shares carrying either limited voting rights or multiple
voting rights.5 2 This statutory authorization for classes of equity
securities with disparate voting rights was the second watershed

47. See Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1834). SC generally
Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common Shares-TheirHistoly,

Legality, and Validity, 15 SEc. REG. L.J. 37, 47-67 (1987) (reviewing restricted shares
under statutory, legal, and regulatory framework in the United States).
48. Taylor, 14 N.J.L. at 223, 237-42.
49. L. GowER, GowER's PRINCIPLES OF

MODERN CoMPANY LAW

403 (4th ed.

1979).
50. Seligman, Stock Exchange Rules Affecting Takeorven and Control Transactions,
HosTiLE TA .ovzR 465,
468-69 n.45 (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988).
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACr OF THE

51. In West Germany, for example, many large companies restrict a shareholder's voting rights to five percent of the total voting power, even if the shareholder
owns more than five percent of the outstanding shares. Fisher, Continental Suffers
From Shareholder Power, Fin. Times (London), June 28, 1990, at 33. This practice
lies somewhere between the American common law practice of one person, one
vote and the dominant modern American practice of one share, one vote. See D.
RATNER & T. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION 830-31 (4th ed. 1991) (describing
various techniques for allocating voting power on other than a one-share, one-vote
basis).
52. Kerbel, supra note 47, at 51-57.
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development. Indeed, in the 1920s nonvoting shares were issued to
nonmanagement shareholders with considerable frequency. 3 The effect was to greatly concentrate voting power in corporate management. A public outcry over this growing practice 4 led the Governors
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to issue the following
statement in 1926: "Without at this time attempting to formulate a

definite policy, attention should be drawn to the fact that in future
[sic] the Committee, in considering applications for the listing of
securities, will give careful thought to the matter of voting control." 55
From this terse statement, perhaps published to head-off federal
legislation on the subject,5 and probably less significant than the
later collapse of the stock market in actually halting dual class capitalizations, 57 grew the decades-long policy that the NYSE would not
58
list non-voting common stock for trading on its facilities.
However significant the policies of the New York Stock Exchange
may be to a company seeking to have its shares listed for trading
on that exchange, it is important to remember that such policies are
not positive law and do not prohibit the authorization and issuance
of non-voting stock. Rather, those policies are declarations of institutional practice, i.e., club rules, designed to induce corporations to
forgo exercise of a power made available to them under state corporation law. They are effective because they police behavior by
threatening to withhold a substantial economic benefit: access to the
near-monopoly on stock trading facilities held by the New York Stock
Exchange in the early and mid-twentieth century. 9
Bearing this in mind, we see that when Congress adopted the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
convention of attributing one vote to each share of common stock
was, thanks to the NYSE, an indubitable part of the prevailing
corporate culture. Like state law's grant of free share alienability,
equality of voting power formed one of the critical background

53. Seligman, supra note 50, at 469 n.46.
54. Id. at 469-70.
55. Exchange Grapples Non-Voting Stocks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1926, at 25,

col. 1.
56. Seligman, supra note 50, at 471.
57. See A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL
1953); Kerbel, supra note 47, at 57 n.60.
58. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,

POLICY OF CORPORATIONS
LISTED COMPANY

MANUAL

163 (5th ed.

313.00(A)

(1990).
59. Professor Eisenberg believes the NYSE stronghold on trading activity
makes it a "de facto legislator." Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1485.
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assumptions for the entire edifice of federal law. Of course, there
was concern as to whether adequate information was being transmitted to shareholders when they were asked to exercise their voting
power. This concern lay behind section 14, the proxy solicitation
provision, of the Exchange Act and its information disclosure requirement. 60 Nevertheless, inasmuch as the fashioning of corporate
stock's core voting attributes had been a function of state law for
many decades before 1933, the newly-minted custom of one share,
one vote was just that-a custom; a custom not mandated by, or
anchored in, state law. Moreover, in 1933, the trait of equal voting
rights, like the attribute of free alienability, was unobjectionable,
and had contributed nothing to the disturbing financial shenanigans
that prompted passage of federal securities law in the first place.
That unprecedented legislation was directed at practices which were
broadly denounced. It was certainly not aimed.at characteristics of
corporate stock that were, at that time, widely acclaimed and seemingly well-controlled by the NYSE.
Careful attention to the history of legal regulation-here, corporate stock-is not only a safeguard against the conceit of modern
practice, it sheds light on the meaning of old texts. As lawyers and
judges struggle to grasp the relevance of federal statutes to contemporary social problems-here, the pertinence of New Deal federal
securities legislation to transformative developments in state corporation law-they must, of course, construe those statutes. In doing
so, they must, in the parlance of the day, engage in legal hermeneutics, the methodology of interpretation. 61 The interpretive process
is not a simple recipe to be uncritically followed but is a task of
multi-dimensional complexity. 62 Examination of the bare linguistic
text (statute) is an essential and, for some, a sufficient starting point.63

60. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). "In order that the
stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his interests
are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not only as to the fimancial
condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of policy, which
are decided at stockholders' meetings." Id. at 74. See Bernstein & Fischer, ThM
Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Rejections on CorporateDnocrac,, 7 U. CHI.
L. REv. 226, 227-28 (1940).
61. e Eskridge, GadamerStatutory Intretation, 90 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 609, 612
n.19 (1990) (providing a useful collection of materials on legal hermeneutics).
62. Id. at 633.
63. Professor Sunstein has criticized this interpretive approach: "In its purest
form, however, the textualist approach is inadequate. The central problem is that
the meaning of words (whether 'plain' or not) depends on both culture and context.
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But to fully understand the textwriter's (Congress') legal "horizon, "6
and the scope of its forward reach into the present, one must move
beyond the words themselves. One must also appreciate the written
"archeological" 6 5 accounts of the deliberations we call legislative
history. That, too, however, is not enough, for often the archives
are distressingly empty or wildly ambiguous. Critical interpretation
must then take account of precisely what in the pre-existing legal
66
order troubled Congress, and to what extent (often very little)
Congress meant to rearrange that order.
As revealing as any of these and other diverse approaches to
statutory interpretation, 67 however, is an understanding of the very
categories of thought that shaped the intellectual climate in which
the statute-text was written. These mental categories for federal
securities law were the fully-formed precepts of state corporation law
and the institutional practices of the NYSE. These precepts and
practices were the unreflected-upon underpinnings, the heavy building blocks of the federal project, and they were pretty much borrowed
wholesale. To understand what Congress did (and did not do) to
corporate stock when it enacted federal securities legislation, one
must see this utter dependence on outside sources and how, taken
together, they molded the paradigm within which thinking about
corporate stock took place. 68
When Congress adopted the federal securities laws, it had no
reason to modify what were then thought to be desirable features of
state law. It simply took for granted that each share of stock had
one vote, just as it took for granted that each share of stock was
freely alienable. It did so, sensibly enough, because those features

Statutory terms are not self-defining, and words have no meaning before or without
interpretation." Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 405, 416 (1989).
64. Eskridge, supra note 61, at 633.
65. Professor Eskridge uses this word, but attributes its coinage to Professor
Aleinikoff. Eskridge, supra note 61, at 611 n.13.

66. See LaRue, Statutory Interpretation:Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. PrT. L. REV.
733 (1987) (discussing need to read statutes in relation to the problem legislators
sought to address).
67. See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 414-51 (describing what Professor Sunstein
calls "standard approaches" to statutory interpretation).
68. Sunstein, supra note 63, at 417 ("The significance of congressional enactments necessarily depends on the context and on background understandings
about how words should be understood."). To Sunstein's point about words, I
would add a point about modes of thought and the larger theme of how federal
and state regulation of a common subject matter are accommodated.
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were deeply and imperceptibly rooted in the corporate culture, even
the mindset, of the early 1930s. But federal law itself neither conferred, nor mandated the eternal preservation of, free alienability
and equal voting rights, and took no position on these matters.
Instead, it regarded those characteristics, crucial as they may be to
the infrastructure of federal securities law, in the same way a carpenter views a foundation laid by a mason: a firm base upon which
to build, but none of his business.
III.

DISPUTED GROUND

The presuppositions of free alienability and equal voting rights
which underlie federal securities law stood unquestioned and unchanged by state law for many decades. The fact that these supposedly
baseline hallmarks of common stock remained intact did not, however, mean that other facets (indeed the larger thrusts) of state
corporation law were unchanging or free from criticism. Nor did
dissatisfaction with the overall condition of state law prevent a massive
and protracted forgetting of the simple, complementary relationship
between federal and state regulation of corporate stock just described.
A.

Degenerate State Law: Two Solutions to the Dilemma of Vulnerable
Shareholders

Throughout the mid-twentieth century the shareholder in a public corporation was widely regarded as occupying a precarious position.0 It was generally thought that shareholders lacked truly effective
mechanisms for insuring management's competence in deploying
investor capital toward the diligent pursuit of corporate goals. Genuine accountability of management to shareholders was doubted."
Corporate suffrage, even as bolstered by the demanding disclosure
requirements of federal securities laws, was seen as little more than
empty ritualism and ultimately feeble as a device for disciplining
slipshod management.71 Only the right to sell stock and leave the
corporation-a course of action entirely dependent upon free alienability-seemed to offer a way out for the disenchanted investor.72

69. This belief stemmed from Berle and Means' famous observation that
management and ownership had become separated in the public corporation. A.
BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CoRPoRATIoN Am PRVATE PROPERTY (1932).
70. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 875 & n.43, 881-84.
71. A. BERLE, EcONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SociEry 7 (1957).
72. B. GRAHAM & D. DODD, Sncuxrry ANALsis 616 (3d ed. 1951).
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This innate structural susceptibility to management misbehavior
and indolence"s was accompanied by two other trends in state corporation law during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. First, modem
corporation statutes continually evolved so as to confer ever greater
discretion and flexibility on management.7 4 Some of these changes
were applauded as enabling management to operate public companies
in a less rigid, more streamlined fashion.7 5 At the same time, many
changes further cemented management's vise-like grip on corporate

affairs to the clear disadvantage of shareholders. 76 A conspicuous
example is the rise of statutory authorization for cash-out mergers.
These statutes were unknown before 1936 and remained rare until
the late 1960s. 77 Initially, they were designed to enhance management's power to alter a corporation's capital structure in ways beneficial to the business enterprise. 78 Later, the oppressive capabilities
of these statutes were fully realized, and they soon gained popularity
as the preferred technique for expelling ("freezing out") noncontrolling shareholders from further participation in corporate affairs.7 9

Corporation statutes of this kind did more than strengthen management's hand. By their very nature as enabling or empowering
legislation, these laws lulled many observers into believing that the
field of corporate law was incapable of exciting intellectual interest; 8°
corporate law had corroded to the point of triviality. The statutes
became little more than legal warrants to act, issued in blank.
Moreover, statutes designed to liberate and assist management in
the pursuit of corporate objectives seemed inherently unsuitable for
preventing the attendant abuse of new-found authority. Only law of
another sort, i.e., judicial vigilance in overseeing the actual exercise
of statutory authority, seemed capable of checking the distressing
73. See CLARx, supra note 27, at 390-94 (discussing the systemic collective
action problems faced by shareholders seeking to exercise corporate suffrage effectively).
74. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE

L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974).
75. Id. at 666.
76. Id. at 666, 669-70 (citing illustrations).
77. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 624, 641, 654 (1981).

78. Id. at 642-43.
79. Id. at 654 & n.184.
80. This was then-Professor Bayless Manning's point in his well-known essay
mourning the passing of corporate law as an intellectually exciting endeavor. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ. 223,
245 n.37 (1962).
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downward drift of managerial behavior under ever more lenient
statutes.
This growing, almost ineluctable, dependence on judicial surveillance of corporate affairs points to a second major trend in midtwentieth century corporate law. Judicial zeal in the oversight of
managerial behavior was distinctly lacking. It became increasingly
obvious that when shareholders challenged management's statutorily
proper behavior as constituting a breach of fiduciary duty, judgesmost notably, Delaware judges-consistently afforded management
the substantial deference (some would say laxness) of business judgment review.8 1 The result was that the odds of a disgruntled shareholder persuading a judge to overturn statutorily authorized corporate
actions, much less to impose personal liability on corporate management responsible for those actions, ranged from slim to nonexistent.82
These corporation law developments, particularly in Delaware,
generated a great deal of doleful commentary83 and led to Professor
William Gary's famous fulmination against the whole affair as a
deplorable "race to the bottom."8' It also rekindled calls for explicit
federal intervention, either along the lines of a wholesale federal
incorporation actes or the imposition of federal "minimum standards"
on corporations of a certain size." Short of enacting new federal

81. Under traditional business judgment doctrine, the reviewing court asks
only whether the action of corporate directors can be attributed to any rational
business purpose. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
There is no inquiry into the merits of the decision. Id.
82. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduiay Model: A Direaor's Duay of Independene, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1351, 1358-62 (1989). This is not to say the Delaware
courts did not occasionally strike down statutorily proper actions. The case of Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (use of corporate machinery and
Delaware law for the purpose of management perpetuating itself in office was
impermissible) is a good example. Professor Branson recently made this last point,
but he also noted that before the 1980s, Shndell was generally given a very confined
reading. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of
Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REv. 85, 96-99 (1990).
83. See, e.g., Comment, Law For Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
84. Cary, supra note 74, at 705.
85. See R. NADER, M. GREN & J. SwoMAN, CoNsTrronmomuzNo THE
CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANr CoRPoRATIoNs
(1976).
86. Professor Cary rejected the idea of a federal incorporation act. Cary,
supra note 74, at 700. He favored a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act applicable
to corporations having more than $1 million in assets and 300 shareholders. Id. at
701-03.
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legislation, however, two other ingenious "remedies" for policing
management misbehavior were conceived during this period. Their
great appeal lay in the fact that neither proposal demanded the
politically arduous task of seeking further legislation; only a thoroughly new and imaginative "understanding" of existing law was
needed.
1. The Corporatization of Federal Securities Law
One antidote, initially for the gaps and later for the shortcomings
in state corporation law, was to draw on existing federal securities
law. To revert to the earlier metaphor of neighboring landowners,
it was suggested that if state law was not properly tending its portion
of the corporate stock parcel then federal securities law should edge
over a bit and introduce more enlightened husbandry.
Borrowing from federal securities laws to bolster dissolute state
corporation law-described as early as 1961 as the creation of a
"wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law'"'81
had spawned a great controversy by the mid-1960s.88 Some observers
at the time believed that federal law was overstepping its bounds
and encroaching far into state terrain. 9 In retrospect, the developments on this front as of 1965, however significant they may have
seemed at the time, were, in fact, relatively tame.
Besides extending coverage of the 1934 Exchange Act to companies with stock traded over-the-counter, 90 federal incursion into
state law largely consisted of implying private causes of action from
various provisions of the federal securities statutes 9 and then applying
those provisions to transactions in which shareholders were allegedly

87. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 910. See also McClure v. Borne
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
88. Compare Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 1146 (1965) (federal law developments are sound) with Ruder, Pitfalls in the
Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 185 (1964) (critique of federal developments).
89. See Ruder, supra note 88. Cf Kaplan, Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAw. 868 (1963).
90. Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. S 781(g)(1)(B)

(1964)).
91. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private cause of
action under SEC proxy Rule 14a-9); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.

Supp. 798, modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5). See generally Fleisher, supra note 88 (discussing other judicial developments as of 1965).
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defrauded. Since disclosure in connection with stock trading and
proxy solicitation was the traditional stuff of federal securities law,
this latter development may have considerably fortified federal weaponry against fraud, but it did not really expand the ambit or purpose
of regulation.2 Moreover, given the unsatisfactory, almost bizarre
patchwork of state law precepts governing securities fraud at the time
federal law was enacted, 93 it seems fairly clear that Congress meant
to augment the claims of investors aggrieved by fraudulent stock
trading events taking place on national securities markets. Empowering defrauded investors to seek redress directly and privately is at
least arguably consistent with congressional intentions, as well as
being quite sensible. In hindsight, it also appears to be a rather
modest breakthrough.
Even exponents of an expansive reading of federal securities
laws did not, at least during the first stage of this effort (up to the
mid-1960s), advocate use of these laws to remedy every claim that
management had breached a fiduciary duty or otherwise mistreated
shareholders. 4 Thus, although a broad construction of federal securities law was gaining favor at the very time the state law developments decried by Professor Cary were taking place, 95 such an
interpretation was not thereby advanced as a general corrective for
the ills of corporation law. A confluence of events, however, soon
replaced relatively circumspect claims for federal securities law with
much bolder assertions.
First, as Professor Sunstein recently noted, the 1960s and 1970s
"marked a revolution in the category of legally protected
rights.. . ."96 While Professor Sunstein emphasized that "the rights
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s was mostly the work of Congress
and the President," 97 it also clearly involved the Supreme Court and
administrative agencies, including the SEC. Moreover, although the
1960s and 1970s are best remembered for landmark legislation protecting civil rights, consumers, and the environment, renewed at-

92. See Fleisher, supra note 88, at 1160-67.
93. 3 L. Loss, SEcuRmES REmu.AroN 1435 (2d ed. 1961).
94. Fleisher, supra note 88, at 1166 ("It is dear that federal law should not
cover every breach of duty associated with a securities transaction.").
95. See supra text accompanying note 84 Qeniency towards management is
effectuating a "race to the bottom").
96. C. SuNSmIN, AFTER THE RIGrHTS REvOLUTION: RncoxCsEMVr TE REGULATORY STATE

24 (1990).

97. Id. at 25.
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tention to shareholders grew out of the larger emphasis on boosting
individual rights via governmental action at the federal level. Second,
case law construing section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and SEC
Rule 10b-5 thereunder, swelled explosively in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. 98 The volume of decisions delineating the reach of Rule
10b-5 expanded so rapidly during this period that the rule almost
developed into a distinct area of jurisprudence. 9 Third, with little
resistance from state law, the use of cash-out mergers to expel
shareholders from corporations grew into the denier cri of oppressive
practices in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 100 Perhaps, many thought,
federal securities law, could be read to check this development, too.
Fourth, throughout the same period, the SEC stepped up its enforcement activity significantly.' 0 1
Armed with a belief that federal securities law intruded more
deeply into corporate affairs than previously thought, 1°2 the SEC
vigorously and tenaciously proceeded on a number of enforcement
fronts. These included not only what we think of as conventional
securities law subjects, e.g., the irksome problem of defining "se° but also more controversial campaigns, such as that
curities, ' 103
against the widespread practice of public companies making questionable payments (bribes) to domestic and foreign business and
government officials' °4 and the even larger and more intractable
problem of director accountability to shareholders. 0 5 This activism
was, no doubt, partially fueled by the "rights revolution" described
by Professor Sunstein. 1 6 It was also undoubtedly influenced by the

98. Chief Justice Rehnquist described the growth of Rule 10b-5 case law as
a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 885
(1975). See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECuRITIs REoULATION 726-29 (2d
ed. 1988).
99. Two multi-volume treatises deal with Rule 10b-5 developments. A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD (1979); A.
JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB-5 (2d ed. 1981).
100. See Weiss, supra note 77-79.
101. Pitt & Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next
Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 191-97 (1990).
102. Even Professor Cary, a tireless critic of corporation law, had grave doubts
about relying on Rule 10b-5 to raise the standards of state law. Cary, supra note
74, at 699-700.
103. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 192-94.
104. Id. at 194-95.
105. Id. at 195-96.
106. See supra text and accompanying notes 96-97.
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idealism of the Vietnam War era, the post-Watergate desire to restore
a sense of integrity to commercial as well as governmental affairs,
and the rising concern over the whole subject of corporate responsibility in post-industrial society. 107
However laudable these larger political and social currents might
be, and however naive it is to divorce legal developments from the
larger cultural milieu in which they arise, reliance on federal securities
law as the potion for remedying corporate ailments eventually encountered a stubborn jurisdictional reality: dominion over corporate
governance and the shaping of corporate stock remained where it
had been left in 1933 and 1934-i.e., with state governments.'c
However powerful multi-national corporations had grown in the
intervening decades, however lamentable their behavior toward shareholders and other persons had become, however poorly state law
responded to these developments, and however broadly Rule 10b-5
might be construed, Congress had done nothing to haul corporate
governance under the cloak of national regulation.
This is not to say that those who applauded utilization of federal
securities law to "upgrade" corporate practice-whether in the traditionally modest area of securities trading or in the field of corporate
governance and social responsibility more generally-failed to enjoy
success. They enjoyed seemingly unstoppable success until the mid1970s. In the years 1975, 1976 and 1977, however, the United States
Supreme Court issued three decisions which abruptly derailed the
"corporatization" of federal law strategy.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,109 the Court held that
persons who do not purchase or sell a security in an allegedly
fraudulent transaction have no claim for relief under Rule 10b-5.
This means, of course, that someone who fails to buy a security
because unduly pessimistic information is disseminated, or who fails
to sell a security because unduly rosy information is disclosed, lacks
a federal remedy. But, beyond ruling that failing to buy or sell in
107. See COMMENrAmES ON COaPORATE STRUCTURE AN GoVERNcE: THE ALIABA SymposiuMs (D. Schwartz ed. 1977-78) (providing a broad sampling of opinions
on corporate governance and social responsibility issues in the mid-1970s).
108. See supra Part H. Congress has, from time to time, considered intervening
into corporate governance but has always refused. Se Boyer, Federalism and Corporation
Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 1037, 1044-56
(1986). Creeping federalization was essentially an effort to read the securitier laws
in a sufficiently broad fashion as to amount, in effect, to federal law on corporate
governance in spite of Congress' refusal to act in the latter area.
109. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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the trading markets gives rise to no federal claim, the decision means,
more generally, that existing stockholders qua stockholders, that is,
as holders (rather than sellers or buyers) of stock, never satisfy the
purchaser or seller requirement and, consequently, have no 'federal
claim for wrongdoing to them in that capacity. With this decision
the range of corporate activity actionable under federal securities law
shrank considerably.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10° the Supreme Court held that
an allegation of scienter, i.e., an "intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud," ' was a necessary element of a claim under Rule 10b-5.
Negligent behavior would not support a claim. Inasmuch as the bulk
of corporate mismanagement grievances (other than breach of loyalty
self-dealing cases) suffered by shareholders amount to claims of simple
incompetence, this ruling meant that, even if the formidable Blue
Chip Stamps hurdle could be cleared, most of the financial damages
inflicted on shareholders would go unredressed by federal law. However vast the losses it may cause, managerial ineptitude is not the
target of Rule lOb-5.
If Blue Chip Stamps and Ernst & Ernst halted the intrusion of
2
federal securities law onto state law turf, Santa Fe Industries v. Green'
chased it back over the fence. In Santa Fe Industries, plaintiff shareholders alleged that Delaware's "short-form merger" statute, which
enabled a parent company owning at least ninety percent of the stock
of a subsidiary to merge with the subsidiary, thereby squeezing out
the subsidiary's minority shareholders by making a cash payment,
violated Rule 10b-5.1 3 The Supreme Court rejected that claim by
holding that Rule 10b-5 outlawed only conduct involving manipulation or deception, not unfairness or director breaches of fiduciary
duty.1 4 Thus, even if a shareholder buys or sells stock and alleges
management scienter, the preconditions required by Blue Chip Stamps
and Ernst & Ernst, federal law offers relief only for fraud, not unfairness or other wrongdoing.
Acting as a kind of judicial surveyor, the Court in Santa Fe went
beyond construing the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
signal its thoughts as to the appropriate boundary line between federal

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
Id. at 193.
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 471-74.
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securities law and state corporation law. The Court did so by offering,
as additional support for its ruling, the rationale that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 had as its "fundamental purpose" 115 that of
implementing a "philosophy of full disclosure' s16 and that the alleged
squeeze-out conduct did not implicate that underlying purpose." 7
Moreover, the Court reasoned that using Rule 10b-5 to regulate
corporate conduct not involving manipulation or deception would
serve "to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations
that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."""
The Court went on to explain why such policies must be honored:
'Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of
the corporation."' 19
A clearer statement as to the interface between federal and state
hegemony over corporate stock would be hard to find. Because federal
securities law bolstered only one facet of the shareholding function,
i.e., access to enterprise information, and was superimposed on an
already existing system of state laws, the latter holds sway unless
Congress explicitly provided otherwise. Since much of what state
corporation law does is constitutive of the very thing we call corporate
stock, it is not surprising that Congress assumed, and so did not
explicitly address, both the structural make-up of that property and
state sovereignty in its design. Those prescriptive functions, the Court
seemed to be saying, plainly fell on the state law side.
The immediate effect of Santa Fe was to squelch efforts to reform
the allegedly dismal condition of state corporation law via the elixir
of federal securities law. 120 There remained, nonetheless, a nagging
ambiguity about the proper relationship between federal and state

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479.

119. Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
120. In the same year it decided Santa Fe, the Supreme Court also stemmed

the growth of implied causes of action under the federal securities laws. Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, reh'g deied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (bidder
lacks standing to enforce antifraud provisions of Williams Act). Taken together,
the Santa Fe and P per opinions delivered two punches that decked creeping federal
corporatization.
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dominion over corporate stock. This ambiguity stemmed from the
Court's apparent line-drawing statement in the Santa Fe holding.' 2 '
The supposedly decisive phrase, "internal affairs of the corporation,"
is fuzzy and lacks real shape.12 2 In fact, this language seemed to
simply reformulate the federal-state clash over corporate stock by
inviting the bedrock question of whether the task of configuring
various qualities (including alienability and voting rights) into the
species of property we call corporate stock-the very thing traded
(alienated) on federal securities markets-is itself an "internal affair
of the corporation"? If so, then in theory state law could redefine
corporate stock so as to subdue, or outright negate, the central feature
of alienability which federal securities law presupposed and built
upon. But this extraordinary reading of Santa Fe, faithful as it may
be, was ripe for neither action nor thought in the mid and late
1970s. At that time, just as in the early 1930s, certain core incidents
of corporate stock were so commonplace as to appear indigenous
rather than assigned. Any suggestion otherwise might well have been
dismissed, even by the most free-thinking corporate lawyers and
scholars, as fanciful or seditious. Rewriting corporate law to squeeze
minority shareholders out of corporations was one thing; curbing the
alienability or voting rights of a majority of shareholders might have
seemed unacceptably heretical. Yet, another decade of experience
with the second proposed "remedy" for the plight of corporation
law would force this seemingly cataclysmic, but historically sound,
interpretive possibility to resurface under more propitious circumstances. When it did reappear, the Supreme Court was compelled
to mark out more clearly the precise contours of its key expression,
and with it, the divide between state and federal law.
2. The Corporation as Marketplace
An altogether different response to, even radical reconception
of, the purported disgrace of state corporation law came from another
quarter. Believing that corporate activity 123 and corporate law 124 are

121. See supra text accompanying note 119.
122. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479. However, its meaning was clear enough in
Santa Fe itself where state law prescribed elaborate procedures for the accomplishment
of mergers while federal law was utterly silent.
123. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Finn: ManagerialBehavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (corporation a nexus
of contractual relations which are, in effect, the firm).
124. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.L. & EcoN.
395, 401 (1983) (corporation statutes are standard form contracts).
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best understood as part of the larger market forces which drive
economic affairs in a capitalist society, proponents of this vision
advanced several novel propositions about corporate law. First, the
alleged "flaws" in state corporate governance identified by Professor
Gary and others, e.g., management's wide range of discretion and
lax judicial review, either may not be flaws at all (and actually may
be virtues) or, if they are flaws, may be self-correcting.'12 In other
words, before we prescribe medicine, we must be sure the patient
is ill or, at a minimum, that he will not get better on his own. The
conventional diagnosis of state corporation law as being in ill health,
traceable all the way back to Berle and Means, 126 is thus turned on
its head.
Second, the chief aim of law should not be to achieve desirable
behavior by regulatory flat, but to emphasize the status of various
claimants on corporate activity as market participants fully able to
order their own affairs.' 27 The upshot is both a specific rejection of
Cary's call for remedial federal legislation and a more general plea
for removal of all legal barriers that stand in the way of, or distort,
old-fashioned bargaining (whether real or imagined). Vindication of
shareholder rights by private ordering, not public regulation, is the
key insight. Less law, not more law, is the asserted outcome.'2
Third, while many markets impinge on corporate affairs, e.g.,
product and service markets,'2 the market for managers,'3 capital
markets,' 3 ' and the market for corporate charters,'3 2 the market for
corporate control, 33 evidenced by hostile tender offers, plays an
especially pivotal role in this market-oriented recasting of corporate

125. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theoy of the Corporation, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252, 258, 261 (1977).
126. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
127. Marine, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110
(1965). See Winter, supra note 125.
128. Winter, supra note 125, at 262-64. This view neglects the way in which
law underlies even so-called "free market" activities. See infra notes 153-54 and
accompanying text.
129. Winter, supra note 125, at 264.
130. Fama, Agency Problems and the Teomy of the Finn, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288
(1980).
131. Winter, supra note 125, at 275-76.
132. Id. See also Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy
Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
133. See Manne, supra note 127 (seminal article on the market for corporate
control). See also Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1497-99 (providing a summary of later
explications).
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law. If management is using corporate resources suboptimally, then
share prices, being informationally efficient,134 should reflect this fact
and be appropriately discounted. Spotting an opportunity to make
money, an enterprising bidder, by launching a tender offer through
the medium of national securities markets, could purchase a controlling block of common stock in the underperforming business,
oust incumbent management, operate the target company more prof135
itably, and capture significant value.
This insightful and laudatory view of hostile takeovers has generated and still generates,' 136 enormous excitement. For one thing,
takeovers (as a means for wresting corporate control from existing
management), are much more effective than old-fangled and rarely
successful proxy fights. Takeovers provide shareholders with money
on the table, not vague election promises of better management.
Moreover, takeovers address the knotty problem of managerial incompetence (as opposed to outright disloyalty) which neither state
17
fiduciary principles nor federal securities law after Ernst & Ernst
tackled with any vigor. Quite simply, if managers are inept, share
prices should fall; bidders, believing they can perform better, suddenly
appear and pay handsome premiums to shareholders for the opportunity. The mere threat of being sacked induces better behavior from
corporate management.138 Furthermore, this potent market for corporate control not only restores shareholder clout in corporate governance and augments investor wealth by virtue of the generous
premiums paid by bidders to dislodge stock, 1 9 its champions also
claimed that it reallocates corporate resources to more highly valued
uses in a way that benefits the entire national economy. 40 Especially
appealing was the fact that the simple and elegant workings of the
134. See Johnson & Millon, The Case Beyond Time, supra note 13, at 2107 &
n.6 (describing the efficient capital market hypothesis).
135. Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HAvv. L. REv. 1161, 1173-82 (1981); Manne, supra note 127,

at 113.
136. See, e.g., Symposium on ContractualFreedom In Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
Rav. 1395 (1989).
137. See supra text and accompanying note 110.
138. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85

L. Rav. 1, 41 (1986).
139. Professor Michael Jensen reports takeover premiums as ranging from
30%-50% over market price. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J.
ECoN. PERsp. 21, 22 (1988).
MICH.

140. See Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 13, at 186667 & n.19, 1892-93 & n.125.
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capital market did not depend on legislatures conferring, or the SEC
and judges straining to divine, exotic (implied) legal claims for
shareholder relief. Rather, the success of a hostile takeover attempt
hinges on the simple willingness of existing shareholders to exercise
their right to alienate stock.
It is no wonder that such a coherent intellectual framework for
understanding corporate activity held such great appeal. The framework was first outlined by Dean Henry Manne,14 1 boosted by Professor (now Judge) Ralph Winter, 42 and subsequently filled out by
their intellectual descendants. 143 This framework offered a perspective
on the nettlesome subject of corporate governance that was at once
fresh, powerful and disarmingly simple. What was only faintly seen
in the euphoria over this engaging case for hostile takeovers, however,
was the crucial way in which the linchpins of the whole takeover
phenomenon were two things so fundamental that, as with all such
matters, they were taken for granted: (i) individual shareholder
autonomy over alienation of corporate stock and (ii) shareholder voting
power to replace incumbent management.14 Without these twin attributes of stock ownership, the whole endeavor collapses. In fact,
advocates of a market model of corporate governance overlooked the
connection between hostile takeovers and the property incidents of
corporate stock because they misread an even more basic relationship,
viz, that of law and markets.
In touting the idea that various markets constrain human behavior more efficiently than stringent legal rules, takeover enthusiasts
reversed the causal relationship between law and markets. Rather
than swallowing the conventional post-Berle and Means view that
law should intervene to correct market imperfections and failures,'4
takeover enthusiasts updated the insights of neoclassical economics

141. Manne, supra note 127.
142. Winter, supra note 125.
143. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 135; Ribstein, TakteorerDeenses
and the Corporate Contract, 78 Gao. L.J. 71 (1989).
144. Winter himself saw the importance of shareholder voting for the market
for corporate control: "The operation of the market for management control,
however, depends upon voting shares which have the power to replace an inefficient
management and offer the opportunity for capital gains." Winter, supra note 125,
at 277. Nowhere, however, is there any hint that the incident of voting power was
then in jeopardy because of antitakeover legislation. Such legislation as existed at
that time simply did not operate in that way.
145. See Fellows & Wu, The Scope of Legal Interrentions in CorporateAffairs, 15
J. Corn,. L. 465, 466, 469 (1990).
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to fit an economy dominated by large corporations. They argued
both that the separation of ownership and management is an "efficient
functional division of the factors of production"146 and that unfettered

market forces will, over time, beget law favorable to investors. 147
Grounding this latter argument on the cardinal economic tenet that,
to survive in a competitive environment, suppliers of goods must
satisfy consumers, theorists likened states to producers of corporation
law that must appeal to shareholder-consumers lest the latter withdraw
their capital and re-invest in enterprises formed under more investorfriendly state law regimes." 8 Judge Easterbrook recently developed
this Winteresque line of reasoning of consumer as king in consoling
market enthusiasts for Easterbrook's unwillingness to void Wisconsin's formidable anti-investor antitakeover statute:
To say that states have the power to enact laws whose
costs exceed their benefits is not to say that investors should
kiss their wallets goodbye. States compete to offer corporate
codes attractive to firms. Managers who want to raise money
incorporate their firms in the states that offer the combination of rules investors prefer ....
Laws that in the short
run injure investors and protect managers will in the longer
run make the state less attractive to firms that need to raise
new capital ....

States regulating the affairs of domestic

corporations cannot in the long run injure anyone but
themselves. 149
This account of how market forces supposedly optimize state
corporation law is open to several lines of attack.150 My objection

146. Id. at 471.
147. Winter, supra note 125, at 274. Favorable law for investors in this model
is law that reduces the transaction costs of contracting with managers in a way
that reduces agency costs. In short, the role of law is facilitative, not corrective.
Fellows & Wu, supra note 145, at 471-72.
148. Winter, supra note 125, at 275-76.
149. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 507
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989) (citing Winter, State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theo~ of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 251 (1977)). See Fischel,
From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause,
and Insider Trading, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 47, 74-84.
150. See Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1507-14. See also Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOzo L. REv. 709 (1987). Professor
Eisenberg cites a number of flaws in Winter's analysis as he attempts to stake out
a position somewhere between Cary and Winter. Although he criticizes Winter and
ends up closer to Cary's side of the issue, Eisenberg does commend Winter for
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works at a more fundamental level. What market advocates did not
see, or care to acknowledge, is that law may subvert the very market
forces that engender law. This is so because the relationship between
markets and the law is not uni-directional, but is reciprocal and
interactive.15 Thus, to focus on corporate law, the very existence of
the market for corporate control depends on features of corporate
stock which owe their existence to state law. By taking away the
features of free alienability of stock and voting rights through the
passage of new state law, the market for corporate control shuts
down and with it goes two claims. First, the claim that market forces
beget law, rather than vice versa, is undercut. Second, the belief
that markets alone, unaided by stringent federal or state regulation,
can restore shareholders to their rightful position as the pillars of
corporate governance is severely shaken. As for Judge Easterbrook's
view that investors will eventually abandon states with inhospitable
corporate law in favor of those with more congenial legislation, state
lawmaking on this subject more closely resembles the conscious parallelism of confident market power than the accommodative bent of
competitive suppliers genuinely threatened by product substitutes.
Unless one resorts to the ipse dixit that state corporation codes must
be agreeable because investors are not leaving in droves, one is hard
pressed to see much evidence of large-scale capital flight from cor-

highlighting optimality as one motivating factor in state corporation law. Thus,
with Winter, he chides Cary's position, as not recognizing that a "state ... will
not depart from optinality too far, because, if it does, the value-decreasing effect
of incorporating in the state could become so large as to invite takeovers or federal
intervention." Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1513. Eisenberg is too generous to
Winter on this point. The fact of the matter is that, today, states are falling all

over themselves to turn off the takeover market without a whit of concern about
the consequences for shareholder wealth. See infra notes 259-71 and accompanying
text. States do so today, unlike the case in the 1970s, by striking at the heart of
takeovers-free alienability of stock and, to a lesser extent, equality of voting power.
Takeovers being thus de-fanged, they can hardly serve as the cure for this state of
affairs. Professor Gary was correct on the point that only federal intervention (or
action by self-regulatory organizations, infra notes 270-80 and accompanying text)
will overturn this trend. Se also Garfield, Stat Competence to Regulate CorporateTakeorers:
Lessons From State Takeover Statutes, 17 HorsTRA L. REv. 535, 593-95 (1989); Sidak
& Woodward, Corporate Takeovers, the Commerre Clause, and the Effient Anonymity of

Shareholders, 84 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 1092, 1116-17 (1990). Neither the federal government
nor self-regulatory organizations, however, should intervene. See infra notes 276309 and accompanying text.
151. SeeJ. Burx, VALUES IN THE MARKETPLACE 7-8, 144-45 (1988); Tribe, Te
Curvature of Constitutional Space: Muat Law)ers Can Learn from Mo&rn Physia, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1989).
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porations organized under statutes with a distinctly pro-management,
anti-shareholder slant. Either investors are not all that upset or, more
likely, there is no place to go.

s2

This objection that law may undermine market forces is the corollary of the legal realist insight that governmental action fashions
the market in which private ordering takes place in the first instance. 153 Governments (whether the legislative, judicial, or executive
branches) do this through laws imbuing property with manifold
attributes and enforcing various bargains. For many legal realists,
the establishment of property rights and of parameters to bargaining
of the kind that make supposedly "private" market activity possible
was just one more form of "public" regulation.'5 More pointedly,
the possibility that state corporation laws may undo market forces
without investor reprisal in the form of redeploying capital in states
with "better" laws is not trivial or simply theoretical. Indeed, in
1977, when Ralph Winter passionately presented the outlines of the
market model, he also saw that state antitakeover legislation 5 5 threatened to gum up the market for corporate control. Somewhat paradoxically, Winter sheepishly added a key caveat to his case against
Cary's call for federal intervention in corporate governance. In light
of state antitakeover statutes, Winter believed that federal regulation
protecting competition in the market for corporate control was justified. 1 6 In effect, Winter confessed that markets alone do not always
yield pro-shareholder legislation. Sometimes law clogs markets.
Therefore, federal law must (slightly and just once) intervene to

152. Sidak & Woodward, supra note 150, at 1115.
Competition among states to provide regulations for governing corporations

does not seem to have produced efficient rules with respect to antitakeover
statutes ....
The large number of states that passed second generation
antitakeover statutes... runs contrary to empirical evidence showing that
interjurisdictional competition in corporate law has produced a "race to
the top" rather than a "race to the bottom."
Id. (footnote omitted).
153. See Singer, Legal Realism Now (Essay Review), 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 491

(1988).
154. Id.; Sunstein, supra note 63, at 444 n.136. See Braucher, Contract Versus
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 697
(1990).
155. See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political

Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977) (describing early antitakeover statutes);
Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,
45

L. Rav. 1 (1976) (same).
156. Winter, supra note 125, at 289.
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displace antitakeover laws. This embarrassing one-shot reliance on
federal law to restore competition resembled a kind of intellectual
cul-de-sac in which the road of unregulated markets is left briefly
to invoke federal corrective power, only to return once more to the
main road. The evil of federal regulation, however, was summoned
for the limited and ironic purpose of rehabilitating unregulated market
competition, a condition which Winter seemed naively to believe
stood logically and temporally prior to regulation like an unspoiled
pre-law Eden.
Significantly, Winter's call for federal intervention to chasten
states passing antitakeover laws would work only so long as state
law also continued to imbue corporate stock with the alienability and
voting attributes undergirding the market model. Alter those bedrock
traits, which are not pristine but depend on state law for their very
existence and shape, and there is either no market or there is a
substantially different, less robust market. In the late 1970s, the
absolute beholdenness of all stock market activity to the property
law attributes supplied by state law went unnoticed because limiting
those attributes would be so radically counter to commonplace understandings about corporate stock as to be unthinkable. This is not
because personal property, here, corporate stock, inherently possesses
certain incidents that foster market exchange, any more than real
property intrinsically possesses one rather than another set of defining
and limiting features. 57 It is only because the conventional attributes
associated with corporate stock were, at that particular time in our
culture, as in the early 1930s, taken for granted. No more than the
air we breathe, the fabrication of corporate stock as conscious endeavor just was not thought about by those, like Winter, who hailed
corporate takeovers, or those who most dreaded them, i.e., target
management and state legislators.

157. See HonorS, Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCP 107 (A. Guest
ed. 1961) (providing an account of the standard incidents of property ownership
in mature legal systems). As Honor6 notes, legal systems confer or withhold various
of these incidents:
[I]n nearly all systems there will be some things to which not all the
standard incidents apply, some things which cannot be sold or left by wJill,
some interests which cannot endure beyond a lifetime, some things (flick
knives, Colorado beetles) which it is forbidden to use or to use in certain

ways.
Id. at 109-10. See also Cohen, supra note 1, at 21-22; Radin, Market-InalLeabiliy,
100 -ARv. L. REv. 1849, 1917-21 (1987) (describing restraints upon alienation as
"incomplete commodification").
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As a result, antitakeover statutes neatly clipping off or snipping
back those predicates of the market model which enabled shareholders
to withdraw en masse from a corporation through the avenue of a
hostile tender offer were not passed at that time. Instead, those who
opposed takeovers because of the supposed social and economic
dislocation caused by such abrupt transactions drafted laws that were
clumsy and overbroad. 15s By doing so, the ability of state lawmakers
to regulate hostile takeovers was sidetracked and stalled, for many
years. Here again, although fueled by an entirely different ideological
vision of law's function, the legal stumbling block was precisely the
same as lay in the path of earlier failed efforts to federalize corporation
law via securities law, i.e., a fundamental misapprehension of federal
law's deep reliance on state law precepts which, however historically
stable, are not intrinsic and fixed, but contingent and fluid. Forgetting
the historic relationship of federal and state law 59 and the malleability
of state law notions led to a serious underestimation of state power
over corporate stock. The result was that while the first wave of
federalization of corporate law had been beaten back in Santa Fe,16°
for several years the challenge to state law by activity on unregulated
federal capital markets appeared far more formidable than it really
was.
B.

Initial Success for the Marketplace Solution: The Failure of FirstGeneration Antitakeover Statutes

The first antitakeover statute reviewed by the Supreme Court
was struck down in 1982 as violative of the commerce clause.' 6' The
Illinois law voided in Edgar v. MITE Corp. made two serious errors.
First, it applied to corporations having an economic connection to
Illinois but organized under the laws of other states 6 2 and, second,
it pointedly conflicted with the clear procedural steps by which tender
offers are to be conducted under the 1934 Exchange Act.'6 Opponents
158. See Langevoort, supra note 155 (describing antitakeover statutes as they
existed in the late 1970s); Wilner & Landy, supra note 155 (same).
159. See Part II.
160. See supra text and accompanying notes 112-19.
161. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
162. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10 (repealed 1983). See Edgar,
457 U.S. at 627.
163. Under the Illinois law, a bidder was required to register the offer with
the Illinois Secretary of State prior to commencing the actual bid for shares. ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54A (repealed 1979). See Edgar, 457 U.S. at
627. Moreover, the Secretary was authorized to hold a hearing on the fairness of
the offer, during which time the bid was held in abeyance. See id.
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of hostile takeovers made these constitutional mistakes because of
their failure to appreciate the interplay between state and federal
law (here the Williams Act and the commerce clause) in regulating
corporate stock in the novel takeover setting. This lack of understanding led not only to constitutional blunders but to serious misjudging of the enormous potential for state law supremacy on the
subject of takeovers specifically and activity on capital markets more
generally.
Evidence of this profound and widespread confusion can be seen
in two distinct portions of Justice White's opinion. First, in concluding that the Illinois statute was preempted by the 1968 Williams
Act Amendments to the 1934 Act, 16 White stated that federal tender
offer law was based on a conviction that an investor "furnished with
adequate information would be in a position to make his own informed choice [as to whether or not he should tender his stock]." 115
This statement is perfectly reasonable. It implicitly recognizes the

distinction between the federal law mission of making available choices
informed and the state law function of providing choker in the first
instance. 166 But White puts a subtle and dangerous spin on that
assertion with the following: "[T]he Williams Act and its legislative
history... indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free
to make their own decisions."'16 Here Justice White implies that
Congress, rather than the states, provides the substantive attribute
of free choice in stock disposition matters. Federal securities laws
have never done that,63 and they certainly do not do so in the
takeover context. 1 0 To do so would be to overstep the boundary
line between federal and state law which Congress took for granted
in the early 1930s, and again in 1968.
Second, in his commerce clause analysis, White faced the claim
that Illinois was simply regulating the "internal affairs of a corporation.1 170 Under the rationale of the landmark Santa Fe decision,
164. Only three justices concluded that the Illinois law was preempted by the
Williams Act. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 639 (White, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and
Blackmun, J.). The Williams Act was enacted in 1968. Pub. L. No. 90439, 82
Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. SS 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(o) (1988)). See gnerally
Johnson & Millon, Misreading The Williams Act, supra note 13.
165. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 633-34.
166. See sLpra note 36 and accompanying text.
167. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 639.
168. ee supra Part H.
169. See Johnson & Millon, Misreading The Widliams Act, supra note 13.
170. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645. This decisive phrase was adopted from Cort, 422
U.S. at 84. Se Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.
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portraying the Illinois law as a regulation of "internal affairs" would
place the subject of takeover regulation firmly in state terrain. Justice
White, however, brusquely dismissed that characterization of tender
offers: "Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders
to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs
of the target company."

17

This cryptic construction of the phrase "internal affairs" did
two things. First, it frustrated state regulation of hostile takeovers
by asserting that such transactions were not "internal affairs." Rather,
according to White, they were "transfers of stock by stockholders"
on interstate capital markets and therefore beyond the regulatory
reach of state government. To White, the case looked like the flip
side of Santa Fe. In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court had forbidden federal
trespassing on state turf, but in White's view, that decision did not
thereby license state law to poach on federal ground. For White,
takeovers took place in interstate commerce; therefore, they fell under
federal dominion. Absent from this analysis was any sense of where
the key trait of transferability originated. Federal law successfully
gained control over the disputed patch of ground because nobody
thought to tell White that interstate transfers took place only because
transfers took place by the grace of state law. This time, however,
the case was not, as in Santa Fe, about a lowly administrative agency
rule (Rule lOb-5) encroaching into state terrain to protect investors;
rather, it involved the awesome commerce clause of the United States
Constitution.
The second aspect of White's conception of tender offers was
that it thrilled two disparate schools of corporate governance. Not
only did it elate those who had earlier championed shareholder rights
via the creeping federalization of corporation law-a trend abruptly
arrested by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe-it delighted the supporters
of a non-interventionist market-centered vision of corporate law.
Ralph Winter had very clearly seen that if states could clog the
market for corporate control under the banner of "internal affairs,"
takeovers would be de-clawed. Less sanguine than Judge Easterbrook
about the market for corporate charters as a back-up disciplinarian,' 72
Winter believed that the demise of takeovers would, in turn, drain

171. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645. Justice White supported this assertion by citing
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 n.53 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 443 U.S. 173 (1979).

172. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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vitality from the larger market-driven notion of corporate law. Thus,
just as Winter had foreseen, this cogent vision of state corporate
governance had an ironic defect: it vitally depended upon the preeminence of federal law's singular emphasis on free capital movement.
Federal law, as it were, was needed to run legal interference for a
view of state corporation law as market driven. 1"3In MITE, Justice
White obligingly declared federal preeminence and so constitutionally
sanctioned and safeguarded this market-centered notion of corporate
law. In one stroke, the legal cornerstone for market transactions in
controlling blocks of corporate stock was laid. Maybe natural law
did not support the corporation-as-marketplace theory, but the U.S.
Constitution is not a bad second. A sense of triumph about such a
heady victory for so young a theory was understandingly hard to
74

suppress. 1

Amazingly though, neither market theorists nor old-fashioned
federal interventionists, much less the Supreme Court, really asked
why shareholders can transfer their stock to third parties on interstate
markets. If they did, they would see that it does not matter whether
or not White was willing to label the power to curtail the incident
of alienability a matter of "internal affairs." What is incontestable
is that the attribute originates neither in the Williams Act nor in
the United States Constitution. It is given and nurtured by state
law. Consequently, it can be taken or shrunk by state law, 175 and

173. The legal realists could not have been happier with such a dramatic
concession on the public underpinnings of "private" ordering. e supra notes 15354 and accompanying text.

174. Professor Bratton dates what he calls the "new economic theory" of the
firm from about 1980. Bratton, Tie New Economic Theoi of the Firm CritiXol Pspedires

From Hisoyy, 41 STAN. L. Rxv. 1471, 1476 (1989). Because of Henry Manne's
work, supra note 127, that of Jensen and Meckling, supra note 123, and that of

Ralph Winter, supra note 125, this author believes economic thinking was afoot in
corporate law somewhat earlier. In any event, many of the works cited by Professor

Bratton first appeared at about the time of, or shortly after, the MITE decision.
Bratton, supra, at 1476 n.22. This author believes that decision gave market enthusiasts a real boost, particularly since Justice White cited some of their work in
his opinion. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44.
175. No issues of constitutional "taldngs" or impairment of contractual obligations are raised by state efforts to redefine corporate stock because corporation
statutes customarily contain a provision reserving power to amend, or repeal, those

statutes. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act 5 1.02 (1984). The practice
of inserting these provisions into corporate statutes grew out of Justice Story's
concurring opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 701 (1819).
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soon it was, after long-established state hegemony over the make-

up of corporate stock had been rediscovered.
C.

Countermoves: Curtailing Stock Alienability and Equal Voting Rights

After the MITE defeat, lawyers representing potential target
companies developed a more straightforward and potent antitakeover
strategy. This strategy sought to undermine hostile takeovers by
carving back the two root attributes of common stock on which
takeovers are founded, i.e., free alienability and equal voting rights.
These incidents were not completely lopped off, just trimmed and

gathered a bit.
1.

Impairing Alienability

Alienability of stock was not directly abridged after MITE. By
no means did shareholders lose formal legal power to transfer their
stock. Rather, the consequences of its collective exercise were made
so prohibitively expensive to a bidder that, in effect, investors lost
the unfettered ability to resolve hostile contests by selling their stock
176
en masse.

176. In 1983, Professor Louis Lowenstein pointed out what he called a "small"
fact about modem corporation statutes: "[N]owhere is it expressed in terms that
management has the right, for example, to prevent third parties from acquiring,
without its approval, ownership of the corporation's properties ....
As to the
takeover bid, ... management lacks a statutorily defined role." Lowenstein, Pruning
Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 263
(1983). In effect, the tender offer phenomenon caught state corporation codes
unprepared. Id. at 264. Moreover, alienability had long been a trait of corporate
stock which enabled individual shareholders to obtain liquidity in the trading market.
Never before, however, had that feature of stock been used to enable shareholders
either to depart from a corporation en masse or to transfer control over corporate
assets as well as stock without management's assent. This author thinks Professor
Lowenstein's analysis, by pinpointing the remarkable silences of the statutory scheme,
may well have hastened the development of what we call "secondgeneration" takeover statutes. See infa notes 195-216 and accompanying text. This
author thinks these silences also reveal the way in which pre-suppositions and social
conventions, as much as positive law, shape legal practices. If there are no takeovers,
which there were not before the 1960s, why should corporation statutes address
them, and why should the historic practice of individual shareholders enjoying
unfettered alienability of stock be problematic? Both corporation codes and the
bundle of attributes comprising corporate stock were, prior to the 1980s, established
against a cultural backdrop in which hostile takeovers were virtually non-existent.
The wave of hostile transactions unleashed by the 1980s, however, buoyed by
MITE, shattered that backdrop and prompted serious rethinking of fundamental
state law precepts.
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The Success of Poison Pill Rights Plans

In the years following MITE, public corporations fearing hostile
1
overtures began implementing "poison pill" shareholder rights plans. 7
Under those plans, boards of directors amend company bylaws to
create a new class of securities. They then distribute to existing
shareholders "fights" to purchase one dollar's worth of those securities for fifty cents upon the occurrence of various triggering events
often associated with a hostile takeover attempt. " 8 Inasmuch as a
hostile bidder is invariably excluded from exercising such rights, and
would face drastic dilution if the rights were widely exercised by
other shareholders, 179 no rational bidder will swallow the poison pill
by unconditionally buying such quantity of shares, or taking such
other action as would set it off. Instead, the bidder must first secure
the incumbent board's consent to the acquisition of stock and request
the board to exercise its retained power to redeem and deactivate
the pill. The upshot is that purchases of large amounts of stock
require the approval of a corporate board of directors as well as the
decisions of individual shareholders.'0 In short, the aim is to make
"hostile" takeovers impossible so that only "friendly," negotiated
acquisitions would remain.
If this strategy could be carried off, it would be an unprecedented
development in corporate law. For the first time, shareholders would
be deprived of the sole power to transfer control over a corporation's
assets simply by transferring ownership of stock. Directors would enjoy
immense influence in large-scale stock dispositions, similar to their
long enjoyed decisive say in corporate mergers. Suddenly, Justice
White's glib dismissal in MITE of stock transfers from shareholders

177. See Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 1989 DuKE L.J.
54, 58-59 (providing a succinct explanation of poison pills). Martin Lipton has
stated that he conceived the idea of poison pills in December 1982. Id. at 55 n.5.

This is shortly after the MITE decision, and its timing reveals the practicing bar's
struggle to devise novel defensive measures in light of a decision striking down
antitakeover statutes. In this respect development of the poison pill paralleled the
rethinking of corporate statutes prompted by Professor Lowenstein. e supra note
176. The Investor Responsibility Research Center found that, as of August 1990,
51% of 1,487 large United States companies had "poison pill" plans, an increase
of 8% over June 1989. Majoriy of Large U.S. CorporationsHare Adopted Poison Pills,
IRRC Finds, 22 SEC. REG. L. REP. 1659 (Nov. 30, 1990).
178. Yablon, supra note 177, at 58-60 & nn.25-26.

179. Id. at 60-61.
180. Notice how tidily poison pill plans fill the statutory "crack"
by Professor Lowenstein, supra note 176.

identified
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to third parties as being "internal affairs" was suspect. After all,
Santa Fe itself involved a corporate merger; collective stock transfers
in the takeover context would now require the same board approval
as for mergers. If the very case giving rise to the rationale of "internal
affairs" involved a merger, and if a takeover could take place only
with the identical board consent as a merger, then perhaps stock
transfers also implicated a corporation's "internal affairs."
The effort to retool the corporate machinery by which hostile
takeovers take place, so as to mimic the mechanics of mergers, still
faced a pair of daunting obstacles. First, unlike corporate mergers,
poison pill plans are not expressly provided for in corporate statutes. 18 1
A key challenge to the implementation of such plans under Delaware
law failed in 1985, however, when the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld a board's statutory authority to establish such plans in Moran
v. Household International, Inc. 18 2 Thus in Delaware only the tactical
deployment and not the establishment of rights plans remained an
18 3

issue.

Second, just as Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Exchange Act had been
used to challenge oppressive cash-out mergers prior to Santa Fe, so
also section 14(e) of the 1934 Exchange Act was thought by some
to bar target management's unfair use of defensive measures. 84 In
the same year as Moran, however, the United States Supreme Court
held that manipulation or nondisclosure is a necessary element of a
claim under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act.'8 The result was that a
target company's defensive conduct in hostile takeovers, e.g., the
deployment of poison pills and lock-up options or the sale of crown
jewels, does not by itself offend federal law. Based on the opinion
of the Supreme Court, devising ingenious ways to shrink the say of
shareholders in hostile takeovers, while expanding that of managers,
gave rise to no federal law claims. Thus, just as Santa Fe had remanded

181. This has now changed. Indiana, for example, pioneered a provision
authorizing implementation of poison pill plans and a provision stating that directors
are not required to redeem pill rights solely because a premium has been offered
to shareholders. IND. CODE ANN. SS 23-1-26-5, 23-1-35-1 (Bums 1989).
182. 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985).
183. This is no small issue, however. See Johnson, supra note 7 (discussing the
Delaware judiciary's post-Moran struggle with this subject); Johnson & Millon, Case
Beyond Time, supra note 13 (same).
184. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). But see Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab,
Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. dnied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
185. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).

1991]

SOVEREIGm-T

OVER CORPORATE STOCK

disputes about the fairness of cash-out mergers to state law, so also
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. meant that controversies over the
fairness of defensive tactics should likewise be settled under state
principles.
In the same way as the corporate jurisprudence of Delaware
had initially heightened shareholder protection in cash-out mergers
after Santa Fe handed the issue back to the states,' so the Delaware
judiciary started damping down on defensive tactics after Schrdber.',
Moreover, just as Delaware later changed course and fitfully relaxed
shareholder protection in cash-out mergers,188 so Delaware gamely
struggled with,18s but then substantially weakened, 190 judicial solicitude for shareholder interests in takeover frays. The rationale for
this nimble turnaround is simple. As important and venerable as
shareholder autonomy over stock disposition matters might be in
corporate law (even if historically tangential to the heart of corporate
law), and however seriously poison pill plans jeopardize that notion,
the Delaware judiciary eventually subordinated it to an even deeper
and more hallowed tenet. At all times, even in the midst of a hostile
bid, management can and must act for the well-being of the corporate
enterprise,191 not for the immediate financial interests of investors anxious
for a premium.1 Thus, in the name of promoting the manifold

186. See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najiar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979) (corporate short form merger requires business purpose); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (corporate long form merger requires business purpose). See
infra note 188 at 704 (overruling Roland and Singer holding that the business purpose
requirement "is no longer the law of Delaware").
187. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986). See generally, Johnson, supra note 7, at 913-22 (discussing shareholder
primacy in Delaware cases).
188. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
189. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 922-25.
190. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989). See Johnson & Millon, Case Bgond Time, supra note 13.
191. This point was made by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 when it
emphasized that corporate directors must assess whether a takeover attempt endangers "corporate policy and effectiveness." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). Furthermore, directors must analyze the
"nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate entaprise." Id. (emphasis
added). The court then went on to recite numerous factors, including noninvestor
considerations, that had a bearing on the corporation enterprise. Id. Being germane
to the interests of the corporate enterprise, such considerations can be said, to use
the rubric of Santa Fe, to be "internal affairs" of the corporation.
192. This point was recently driven home by the Delaware Supreme Court in
its Time decision. See supra note 190. The court stated that a board's responsibility

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 16

interests of the corporate entity, management may resist and rebuff
the advances of hostile bidders, even if that means denying shareholders an opportunity to tender their stock. In short, the interests
of the enterprise are distinct from and trump those of investors. This
landmark outcome is of immense normative importance in corporate
law. 193 And it was possible only because the most authoritative corporate tribunal in the country believed what the United States Supreme Court had blithely forsworn in MITE: takeovers and responses
to them implicate the "internal affairs" of the corporate enterprise.
The result is that, unless this judicial ruling is itself unconstitutional,'9 4
the strategic countermove of trimming the attribute of alienability
has been successful.
b. The Success of Second and Third Generation Antitakeover
Statutes
The Delaware judiciary was not the only lawmaking body coming
to grips with the unsettling effects of corporate takeovers on corporation law. During the mid-1980s, state legislatures were busy
passing unusual and robust antitakeover statutes. 95 Besides limiting
their coverage to domestic corporations and making sure they did
not run afoul of the procedural requirements of the Williams Act,
two fatal but easily remedied flaws of the Illinois statute, 96 the socalled "second" and "third" generation statutes took a radically
different tack than the law struck down in MITE.
Although experimentation was the byword of the day, and a
welter of statutes sprang up, 197 these laws shared a critical thrust.
The statutes struck at the very heart of shareholder autonomy over
corporate stock disposition. Like poison pill plans, these statutes did

was to "chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interest . . . ." Paramount,
571 A.2d at 1150. And, except for the "limited set of circumstances as defined
under Revlon, [a target board is not] under any per se duty to maximize shareholder
value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover." Id. See Johnson &
Millon, Case Beyond Time, supra note 13 (footnote omitted) (discussing Delaware's
new re-emphasis on duty to the enterprise rather than to the investors).
193. See Johnson, supra note 7; Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note
13.
194. See Johnson & Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in
Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989) (raising but rejecting argument).
195. See Johnson, The Eventual Clash, supra note 13, at 36-37 n.3 (describing
the various types of antitakeover statutes enacted in the mid-1980s); infra notes 26571 and accompanying text (describing the latest versions).
196. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 195.
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not directly divest shares of the alienability attribute. Rather, they
sought to impose a substantial levy on bidders who hostilely purchased
significant blocks of stock. The levy ranged from potential loss of
voting rights in the stock acquired (under control share acquisition
statutes) 93 to the inability to cause the corporation to engage in
certain financially desirable transactions for several years (under
business combination statutes). 19 Again, as with poison pill plans,
no sensible bidder will risk these deal-breaking outcomes by unconditionally buying a triggering block of stock in the target company.
Instead, the offeror must launch a bid conditioned on procuring the
consent of shareholders as a class (under a control share acquisition
statute) or of the incumbent board (under a business combination
statute). The upshot of these statutes, as with poison pill plans, is
to supplant the individual shareholder's decision to alienate his or
her stock as the sole determinant of a hostile bid's success. The
agreement of individual shareholders to sell is still necessary but is
no longer sufficient.
The control share acquisition statute was upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1987.200 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the
Supreme Court held that Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Statute'01
was neither preempted by the Williams Act nor in violation of the
commerce clause. In both the preemption and commerce clause
portions of its opinion, the Court pointedly spoke to federal-state
relations in regulating corporate stock.
Under a control share acquisition statute, the purchaser of "control shares" gains voting rights to those shares only if target company
directors or a majority of disinterested shareholders vote to confer
those rights. 202 One of the arguments made to the Supreme Court
was that Indiana's statute was preempted by the Williams Act because
the need for a shareholder plebiscite on the voting question and the
possibility of a negative outcome might "limit or delay the free
exercise of [voting] power after a successful tender offer."m A key
premise of this argument is that Congress had taken affirmative
measures to guarantee such voting power. The Court responded to

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
201. IND. CODE ANm. § 23-1-42-1 (Bums Supp. 1990).
202. A summary of Indiana's statute and how it operates can be found in the
Court's opinion. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 72-75.
203. Id. at 85.
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that claim by noting that such a reading of the Williams Act would
result in preemption of "a variety of state corporate laws of hitherto
unquestioned validity ...
,"04 Among the laws mentioned by the
Court were those permitting staggered terms for directors and cumulative voting. 2 5 These too somewhat impair the franchise after a
purchase of stock. To strike them as unconstitutional would be an
extraordinary and far-reaching outcome. Such an effect would so
seriously undermine the "longstanding prevalence of state regulation
in this area ... that, if Congress had intended to preempt all state
laws that delay the acquisition of voting control following a tender
6
offer, it would have said so explicitly.' '2
Thus, Indiana's law passed preemption muster in CTS Corp.
because, unlike Illinois' statute in MITE, it did not run afoul of the
federal time periods and procedures by which tender offers are to
be conducted. But, having left the process of tender offers untouched,
a state is not required to accord a particular packet of voting rights
to such stock as may be purchased in that offer. A state might alter
the very contexture of the property bid for, going so far as to nullify
such a rudimentary trait as voting rights. This, the Court reasoned,
was the state's prerogative, and did not conflict with federal law.
To hold otherwise would be to read fiction into the modest disclosure
and procedural provisions of the Williams Act. It would amount to
a conclusion that Congress eternally affixed to corporate stock such
desirable substantive attributes as will ensure the making of hostile
bids.
The Court returned to and elaborated on this cardinal theme
of state-federal relations in its commerce clause analysis. Acknowledging the "variety of tests' 20 7 created by its earlier commerce clause
cases, and wishing to keep its analysis straightforward, the Court
asserted that state legislation would violate the dormant commerce
clause only if it either discriminated against interstate commerce or
subjected interstate activities to inconsistent regulation. 208 The Court
concluded that Indiana's law did neither. The statute regulated only
corporations organized under Indiana's laws, a power that was undisputed if not precisely located. "No principle of corporation law

204. Id.
205. Id. at 85-86.
206. Id. at 86.
207. Id. at 87.

208. Id. at 87-88.
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and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to
regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the
'
voting rights of shareholders.

29
1

Having said that, however, the Court again met the argument
that, left unchecked, the principle of state control over voting rights
would hinder interstate tender offers. By jiggering voting rights, the
argument went, states diminished the attractiveness of corporate
stock. That, in turn, would effectively halt the market for corporate
control, an interstate market. The Court was urged to denounce this
cunning but transparent move to undermine corporate takeovers and
the eminent principle of federal sovereignty over interstate commerce.
Here, like rival landowners claiming a disputed patch of ground,
state dominion over corporate stock squarely confronted the formidable challenge of federal autonomy over interstate commerce. The
decades-long peaceful coexistence of these two regimes was in jeopardy on this question. One*of the two claimants would gain and
one would lose the coveted turf.
Once more the Court underscored that "state regulation of
corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence
and attributes are a product of state law. ' 2 10 In regulating corporate
affairs, state laws "necessarily affect certain aspects of interstate
commerce,''211 sometimes prohibiting or making transactions more
difficult. In spite of that potentially dampening effect, it remains
"an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States
to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the
rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares. ' 21 2 Applying that
general guiding principle to tender offers, the fact that states may
so markedly redefine corporate stock so as to sap it of appeal to
hostile bidders, thereby reducing the number of such bids on interstate
capital markets, "would not substantially affect our Commerce Clause
analysis. ' ' 213 Inasmuch as Indiana's law did not purport to prohibit

209. Id. at 89. The Court is saying that because Indiana's statute regulates
domestic corporations-a "firmly established" principle-the statute creates no risk
of regulation inconsistent with that of another state. Thus, the statute is not
unconstitutional by reason of offending the commerce clause. Not being unconstitutional, the statute stands. It stands because states may act unless prohibited by
the Constitution.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 90.

212. Id. at 91. See supra note 209 (firmly established state regulation of domestic
corporations is the constitutional basis for state activity in the "business landscape").
213. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 93.
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offers or sales of corporate stock in interstate markets as such, but
only re-formulated the characteristics of the good to be sold in those
markets, it was acting constitutionally:
The very commodity that is traded in the securities market
is one whose characteristics are defined by state law....
Indiana need not define these commodities as other States
do ... . Accordingly, even if the Act should decrease the
number of successful tender offers for Indiana corporations,
214
this would not offend the Commerce Clause.
In holding that dominion over the task of adding and subtracting
the substantive attributes of corporate stock lay with the states, the
Court was doing what it had done ten years earlier in Santa Fe but
had bypassed in MITE. It was spurning efforts to substitute corrupt
state corporation law with federal law purportedly more enlightened
and beneficial for investors. It mattered not that in CTS Corp. the
Williams Act and the United States Constitution, rather than Rule
10b-5, were the legal battering rams for the assault on state law.
Nor was it of any consequence that the driving ideological thrust
was more a libertarian fondness for anti-regulatory, pro-capital securities markets than a hankering for creeping federalization of corporate law. However the attack on state power was philosophically
fueled or legally framed, and whatever the virtuous economic or
regulatory interests set against that power, 215 the Supreme Court was
adamant. For good or bad, hegemony over the prescription of corporate stock's substantive attributes lay with the states. 215

214. Id. at 94.
215. The Court was unmoved by the alleged economic merits of hostile takeovers:
"The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic
theory." Id. at 92.
216. In 1989, the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin's "business combination"
statute. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). The decision is notable in several respects.
First, Wisconsin's legislation is virtually impregnable, unlike the Indiana law upheld
in CTS. Second, the opinion reveals a remarkable grasp of the takeover subject
and the vast literature on it. Third, the opinion's analysis is exquisitely faithful to
the reasoning of CTS. Fourth, the author of the opinion is Judge Frank Easterbrook,
former University of Chicago law professor and articulate advocate of the value of
economic analysis in law. If so able a spokesman of a market-driven vision of
corporate law concedes sovereignty to the states, the intellectual battle over the
legality of state antitakeover laws as they now exist seems finished. In this respect,
Amanda is almost as significant as CTS in causing opponents of these laws to decamp.
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2.

Constricting Voting Rights: The One-Share, One-Vote
Decision
Burdening the sale and purchase of stock in the manner achieved
by poison pills and antitakeover statutes greatly diminishes the risk
of corporate insurrection by means of a hostile takeover. It does not,
however, eliminate it by way of another path-the proxy fight.
However historically improbable ouster of incumbent management
by means of a proxy contest may have been, 217 it has always remained
a theoretical, if slumbering, possibility.218 Moreover, two contemporary facts of corporate life make a resurgence of proxy battles
especially likely.
First, shareholders who witness management repelling a high
premium bid may become upset and more receptive to an insurgent's
request for a proxy. This might even be true of shareholders in
companies other than the target. Watching high profile skirmishes
elsewhere can sensitize a shareholder to uprisings closer to home.
In short, the usual stumbling blocks of a successful proxy challenge,
i.e., investor apathy and strong allegiance to management, might
be overcome if the financial stakes are both high and plainly visible.
Second, due to the rise of institutional ownership of stock, share
ownership in public corporations may not be as widely dispersed as
is commonly believed. 219 With greater concentration of ownership
217. Professor Seligman describes the extreme unlikelihood of ousting management through a proxy battle:
During the period 1956-1977, the SEC published data on proxy contests
for all firms subject to Commission jurisdiction under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act. During that period, management retained control
at least 99.7% of the time each year. During the last 11 years for which
data are available, management retained control at least 99.9% of the
time each year.
Seligman, supra note 50, at 474 (footnotes omitted).
218. Recently, the threat of a proxy battle with Girard Partners L.P. led Pic
'N' Save Corporation to make various concessions to Girard, including the right
to designate three of the eight board members. Rose, Pic W' Sae Puts Balc!der,
Associates on its Board, Agrees to Other Masures, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1990, at A2,

col. 5. NCR Corporation also faces a proxy battle after spuming a takeover bid
by American Telephone & Telegraph Company. Smith, NCR Rebuffs AT&T, Faces
Prox.y Battle, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1990, at A4, col. 4.
219. According to a study conducted by the Columbia University Law School
Institutional Investor Project, ownership of corporate stock is increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional owners. White, Giant Pension Funds' Explosire
Growth Concentrates Economic Assets and Power, Wall St. J., June 28, 1990, at Cl,

col. 2. As one example, the twenty largest "retirement funds now account for more
than 25% of all pension assets, including stocks, bonds and other investments, up
from slightly more than 21% in 1985." Id.
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comes greater facility in coordinating collective action and, accordingly, more clout. 220 That clout might be used at an annual or special

stockholders' meeting to install more obliging directors, persons who
will either immediately dismantle the antitakeover armor2 21 or, if and
when another attractive hostile bid appears, will timely redeem the
poison pill and provide necessary consents under business combination statutes. Through the power of the voting mechanism traditional
shareholder autonomy over stock alienability can be shorn from the
managerial meddling made possible by poison pill plans and avant
garde takeover statutes.
Together, these considerations meant that corporate suffrage
represented a viable avenue for shareholders to flex their muscle and
reclaim the center of the corporate stage. It therefore posed a grave
threat to management's tenure. To counteract that hazard, many
managers of potential target companies in the mid-1980s sought to

constrict the shareholder franchise through dual class recapitalizadons.

222

Here, unlike the case with alienability, history and state law
were on management's side. 223 State corporation statutes had long

220. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
221. Pic 'N' Save Corporation recently agreed to redeem its poison pill rights
and to urge shareholders to vote to opt out of coverage by Delaware's antitakeover
statute. See Rose, supra note 218.
222. The mechanics of recapitalizations aimed at reducing the voting power
of nonmanagement shareholders are described by Professor Gordon. Gordon, Ties
that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L.
Rzv. 3, 40-42 (1988). The aim is to concentrate high-voting common stock in the
hands of corporate management and low-voting, or nonvoting stock in the hands
of public investors. Professor Gordon also describes the collective action and strategic
choice problems associated with dual class recapitalizations. Id. at 42-60.
223. Almost all state corporation statutes authorize dual class common stock.
It is true that state securities regulations in eighteen states prohibit or regulate the
offering of nonvoting or limited voting shares. See Seligman, supra note 50, at 477
& n. 113. However, companies with securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange
or the American Stock Exchange are ordinarily exempt from those regulations. Id.
at 477 & n.114. Moreover, even if the states withdrew that exemption, see id. at
477 & n. 115, the rules against issuing nonvoting and limited voting stock are often
not absolute. For example, the most recent policy statement by the North America
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) considers offerings of such securities
to be "unfair and inequitable" "[u]nless preferential treatment as to dividends and
liquidation is provided... or the differentiation is otherwise justified .... " NASAA
Rep. (CCH) 2401, at 1501 (1990). As Professor Gordon points out, exchange
offer recapitalizations do offer a dividend preference, thereby complying with NASAA
policy. Gordon, supra note 222, at 48. Furthermore, several of the state regulations
turn out, on close examination, to be quite mild. For example, Alabama's regulation
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authorized disparate voting rights in classes of common stock and,
for a brief period in the early twentieth century, numerous companies
had issued classes of stock with unequal or no voting power.22* The
only snag to a dual capitalization strategy (besides shareholder consent
which, with an appropriate financial inducement, seemed assured)
was the New York Stock Exchange's 1926 one-share, one-vote policy.2
Even this august practice presented no insurmountable hurdle because
the Exchange's stature in the trading markets was considerably less
in the mid-1980s than it had been in the 1920s.26 Whereas earlier
the New York Stock Exchange's practices were a dominant factor
in shaping many of the conventions of American corporate stock
culture, the eager rivalry of the American Exchange (AMEX) and
the over-the-counter market severely imperiled that pacesetter role.2
Thus drawn to the evident antitakeover advantages of dual
classes of common stock like moths to a flame, several New York
Stock Exchange-listed companies in 1984 proposed such recapitalizations to their shareholders.28a These plans presented a direct challenge to NYSE policy. Precipitated by General Motor's plan to issue
a second class of common stock with one-half vote per share, the
NYSE, reluctant to lose the substantial revenue from GM's listing

applies only to companies in the formative stages or those without operating profits,
hardly candidates for takeover. Alabama Rule 830-X-4-13, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
7453, at 3433 (1990). Ohio requires only that the fact of voting power disparity
be prominently disclosed on the front cover of the offering circular. Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 45,707, at 40,601 (1986). Texas regulations authorize the securities
commissioner to consider whether offsetting benefits (like a dividend preference)
accompany the stock. TExAs ADN. CODE S 113.3(b), Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
55,583, at 49,522 (1990). Taken together, these factors substantially reduce the
constraint on dual capitalizations seemingly supplied by state blue sky laws.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. As a practical matter, today it
is far from clear that many of the beneficiaries of institutionally-held stock have
effective say on how that stock is voted. Thus, to a possibly large degree, the vote
may already be separated from the holder of the financial incidents of stock.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 55 & 58.
226. The weakening of the NYSE's competitive position is succinctly described
by Professor Gordon. See Gordon, supra note 222, at 5-6.
227. In the mid-1980s, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
did not prohibit nonvoting or limited voting stock by companies whose securities
were traded over-the-counter. The AMEX did not permit nonvoting stock but,
within limits, did permit classes of stock with disparate voting rights. Am. Stock
Ex. Guide (CCH) 10,003, at 3514 (1974). See Seligman, supra note 50, at 47273.
228. See Kerbel, supra note 47 at 40-41 nn.6-9 (providing the names of several
corporations that adopted dual capitalization plans); Gordon, supra note 222, at 4,
80-85 (same).
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to the American Exchange or the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), undertook a review of its longstanding policy. The 1985 report of the committee
appointed to reconsider the rule cited various factors in support of
relaxing the rule2 9 but the specter of trading competition seemed
predominant. The outcome of the committee's deliberations was a
recommendation, hedged in with several conditions, that dual capitalization with unequal voting rights among classes no longer be a
bar to listing privileges on the Exchange. 230 Sixty years of practice
was to be set aside.
Responding to the saber, rattling of possible federal legislation
dictating one share, one vote,231 officials of the NYSE then huddled
with those of AMEX and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD). The discussion centered on whether, rather than
the NYSE dropping its historic ban, the other two bodies should
impose their own. The NASD balked, and in 1986 the NYSE, bowing
to competitive pressure, proposed to relax its rule even further than
initially recommended. In accordance with section 19(b) of the 1934
Act,2 2 the Exchange then sent its new rule on for SEC approval.
The SEC did not endorse the proposed rule. Claiming to act
pursuant to section 19(c),2 3 the agency promulgated its own rule for
comment. After receiving extensive comments on the proposed rule,
the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 in final form in July 1988.234 The rule
did not mandate that public corporations adhere to a policy of one
share, one vote. It proceeded more obliquely. The rule prohibited
all national securities exchanges and national securities associations
from listing the stock of such companies who had thereafter adopted
dual capitalization structures that reduced the voting power of existing
shareholders. The SEC reasoned that corporations could voluntarily,
229. See Kerbel, supra note 47, at 64.
230. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INITIAL REPORT

OF THE SUBCOMMrrrEE ON
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND QUALITATIVE LISTING STANDARDS 3 (Jan. 3, 1985).

231. See Kerbel, supra note 47, at 65 n.81 (describing S. 1314, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985) and H.R. 2783, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985)). See also Tender
Offer Reform Act, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CoNo. REc. H2540
(Apr. 27, 1987) (proposal for establishing federal one-share, one-vote standard).
232. 15 U.S.C. $ 78s(b) (1982).

233. Id. S 78s(c).
234. Voting Rights Listing Standard; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg.
26,376, 26,394 (1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. S 240.19c-4 (1990)). See Comment,
Toward a Liability Rule Approach to the "One Share, One Vote" Controversy: An Epitaph
for the SEC's Rule 19c-4?, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1761 (1990) (critiquing Rule 19c-4
from a contractarian viewpoint).

1991]

SOVEREIGNTY OVER CORPORATE STOCK

if begrudgingly, follow a policy of equal voting rights, because publicly held companies want their stock listed for national trading and
all major outlets for stock trading are covered by the rule.
Plainly, the SEC doubted its ability to directly adjust the voting
rights of corporate stock. The key legal question was whether the
SEC could indirectly accomplish that result by its oversight of national
securities exchanges and associations. But this strategy, however
apparently new and canny, was in fact the same backdoor federalization strategy defeated twice before. It lay behind the effort to
extend SEC Rule 10b-5 into corporate governance so as to check
the unseemly practice of cash-out mergers. It was also the central
game plan for curbing state antitakeover regulation through a historically unsound reading of the Williams Act and by conjuring the
commerce clause into a guarantor of stock alienability. Indeed, the
one-share, one-vote issue is simply the reverse side of the issue in
the antitakeover statute cases lost in CTS Corp. and Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods, Inc. In the latter set of cases, the decisive
legal question was whether the states had acted unconstitutionally.
On the one-share, one-vote issue, the critical question was whether,
as an administrative agency, the SEC had overstdpped its statutory
grant of authority. But both questions bottom on a more basic
inquiry-wherein lies the sovereign power to define stock attributes?
Whose turf is it?
Twice the flanking strategy had failed because twice federal law
was being pushed beyond its proper bounds. Now, both in spite of
those defeats and in order to surmount them, and in a final effort
to salvage a role for federal law in stemming the dizzying erosion
of shareholder rights under state law, regulatory hegemony over the
places where stock is traded was used to impose a kind of dress code
for admission, i.e., unless common stock looks a certain way, no
trading.
However thoroughly one scours the legislative history of the
1934 Act, or however broadly one tries to read certain of its key
provisions,235 all arguments in support of SEC authority to adopt

235. Professor Seligman makes the strongest case for SEC authority to adopt
Rule 19c-4 that this author has seen. Se Seligman, supra note 50, at 477-79. But
even he has some doubt because he states only that the SEC has such power "in
all probability." See also Coffee, Regulating the Marketfor Corporate Control: A Critiml
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLuM. L. RLv. 1145,
1259 & n.345 (1984); Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: 77k One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 687, 714-19 (1986).
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Rule 19c-4 boil down to one ultimate claim. In the early 1930s,
Congress not only assumed that shareholders had equal voting rights
because of NYSE policy,236 it also intended that if that pre-under-

standing ever changed then the SEC was empowered to restore equal
voting rights. That viewpoint is conceptually incredible and historically unsupportable. Acting against a legal backdrop in which equal
voting rights and alienability were taken for granted, Congress built
upon them, but it did not enshrine them. Congress never drafted a
contingency plan to kick in if and when circumstances changed.
Altering the substantive attributes of stock might indeed jeopardize
the regulatory edifice constructed by Congress as an overlay on state
law. But that outcome is no warrant for inferring that Congress had
prophesied and provided for precisely that possibility when, in fact,
it never thought about the matter.237
When the basic complementary relationship between state corporation law and federal securities law is recalled, 238 especially in
light of the Supreme Court's line-drawing efforts in Santa Fe and
CTS, the decision of the Court of Appeals in vacating Rule 19c-4
is no surprise. The SEC had lost the case long before it was decided.
This can be seen in the court's treatment of SEC reliance on section
19(c) of the 1934 Act as the statutory keystone for its rule. Because
that section authorizes the SEC to adopt rules "otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this [title],"3 9 the court was quickly led
to the bedrock question: "What then are the 'purposes' of the
'
Exchange Act?

240

The SEC's principal claim was that section 14(a)'s blanket grant
of power to regulate the solicitation of proxies revealed a congressional
intention "to ensure fair shareholder suffrage.' '241 Probing behind
the vague reference to "fair corporate suffrage" in the legislative
history, the court found that Congress' true aim for the 1934 Act's
proxy provisions was to ensure that shareholders had "adequate
knowledge" by shareholders of the major questions to be decided at
236. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
237. The author finds no basis whatsoever for making the following kind of

statement about what was on Congress' mind in 1934: "In 1934, Congress presumably must have viewed nonvoting common stock or common stock with disproportionate voting rights as ... an abuse." Seligman, supra note 50, at 479. See

supra note 46.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra Part II.
15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
Business Roundiable, 905 F.2d at 410.
Id.
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stockholder meetings. 2 2 In other words, as to the pointed question
of how Congress intended the very general objective of "fair corporate
suffrage" to be realized, the court's answer was, unsurprisingly,
"disclosure." Moreover, the court highlighted language in the House
and Senate Reports 43-and could have emphasized the language of
section 14(a) itself 2 -to declare that it was only the solicitation of
proxies Congress regulated. Since the goal was to improve the flow
of information when proxies are solicited, to read into section 14(a)
a general concern with voting rights is to regulate not only the
solicitation of proxies but also the stock of shareholders.
That the SEC actually abjured the Congressional philosophy of
disclosure because the SEC did not believe even informed shareholders could be trusted to decide whether to relinquish voting rights
by approving a dual capitalization plan was not lost on the court.
The court could not resist tweaking the SEC by observing that
Congress itself "acted on the premise that shareholder voting could
work, ' 245 and hastening to add that Congress "did not seek to
regulate the stockholders' choices. ' '24 Shareholders were free to disenfranchise themselves.24 7 But the court could have gone even further.
Not only did Congress not dictate how shareholders can choose, it
did not even dictate (as opposed to assuming) that shareholders must
have the right to choose at all. Why should it? In the early 1930s,
it was not an issue. It only became an issue decades later, in the
1980s, when legal reactions to hostile takeovers quickened the antishareholder drift of state law earlier noted by Gary and others.
Recognizing that Rule 19c-4 had crossed beyond Congressional
concern with information and into the state law domain of corporate
powers, the court saw little to impede further incursions once that
move was made. Were that to happen, the result would be the same
as that to which an expansive reading of Rule 10b-5 was being put
in the 1960s and 1970s: federal corporate law by administrative
rather than legislative action. This time, however, the vehicle being
used was access to national capital markets. Citing Santa Fe's emphasis

242. Id. See supra note 60.

243. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1934). See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
244. See 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(a) (1982).
245. Business Roundable, 905 F.2d at 411.
246. Id.

247. &e Comment, supranote 234 (arguing, from a "contractarian" viewpoint,
that shareholders should be free to contract away their voting power).
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on the supremacy of state law in regulating internal affairs and in
assembling the substantive attributes of corporate stock, the court
refused to read section 19(c) as a blank check for the SEC to alter
'2
that "tradition. 4
Finally, the court observed that although the attribute of equal
' 249
voting rights may be "an important part of the background
against which Congress acted, nowhere is there evidence that one
of the purposes of the federal securities laws is "preservation of the
one share/one vote principle.''2-° In these few words, the court captured a simple but stubborn fact about federal securities law, i.e.,
its utter beholdenness to state law for sculpting the contours of the
commodity it regulates. And that cogent recognition extinguished
the last embers of a persistent but failed effort to make federal law
do more than it was ever designed to do.
IV.

SHOULD CORPORATE STOCK BE REJUVENATED?

In one sense it seems odd that there was ever any doubt as to
whether a federal law almost sixty years old did or did not usurp
control over a key corporate subject. But the question of which legal
regime (state or federal) governs an area never arises, or is of any
interest, in the abstract. Rather, that debate is fueled by disagreement
over specific issues that may develop long after the legal machinery
is in place. Eventually, social, political or economic change leads to
the emergence of conflicting beliefs on concrete matters. In a political
system founded on principles of federalism, over time the merits of
the dispute evolve to crystallize around two positions, i.e., continuation of state practices or a federal override. The result is a turf
battle.
The supposed points of conflict between federal and state law
described in this article would have been meaningless sixty, fifty,
forty, or even thirty years ago. Only chronic spoliation of state law,
coupled with the acute emergence of the hostile takeover phenomenon
and the increasingly sophisticated responses to it, produced this dash.
One's beliefs about the relative value of those two transshaping

248. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412 (noting that "[a]t least one Commissioner shared this view, stating '[s]ection 19c does not provide the Commission
carte blanche to adopt federal corporate governance standards through the back door
by mandating uniform listing standards' (quoting Final Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. at
26,395/1) (Grundfest, Comm'r, concurring).
249. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413.
250. Id.

1991]

SOVEREIGNTY OVER CORPORATE STOCK

developments generally control whether one prefers state or federal
law. Thus, if the drift of corporate law over the past several decades
is disturbing, some would look to market forces such as hostile
takeover activity as remedies. In this simplistic view, markets are
decontextualized into extra-legal phenomena that benevolently constrain corporate law and eventually correct its ills. Yet, if nurturing
market forces requires a regulatowy presence in the form of a federal
override (via claims that state law is preempted or violates the
commerce clause) or federal intervention (via new legislation), some
are unwilling to contravene state authority.25 Others, however, might
be willing to pay that political price to revitalize market activity,
while still others are less enamored of hostile takeovers generally and
would deal with undesirable developments in corporate law through
other means. The underlying issues should be tackled openly and
not dodged by various artful claims that existing federal law has
very much to say about them, precisely because they generate such
heated discussion and disparate responses. 25 What are those issues,
3
and who should address them?2

A.

The Direction of State Corporation Law

Disturbed as he was in 1974 at the weakened position of shareholders in public corporations, compared to their status in 1990,
Professor Cary should have been elated. Especially over the past six
years, state corporation law has severely shackled shareholder influence over corporate affairs. This dampening of shareholder say is a
direct result of hostile takeovers. This trend is evidenced by both
corporate statutes and, after a brief flirtation with shareholder preeminence, current judicial review of defensive measures as well.
Whether one focuses on the proliferation of insuperable antitakeover

251. Professor Romano, for example, is disturbed by antitakeover statutes but
reluctant to advocate federal intervention. See Romano, supra note 150.
252. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 868. See also id. at 868 nn.11, 12 & 869
n.17 (referring to works treating various facets of the takeover controversy).
253. In another context, Professor Stanley Fish has recognized the importance
of addressing who gets to decide answers to legal questions:
After all, the crucial question, which returns the original problem to center

stage, still has to be asked: Who gets to make the rules? And once that
question is answered, another question (it is really the same) waits behind
it: Who gets to say who gets to make the rules?
Fish, Force, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 883, 884 (1988).
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laws or the Delaware Supreme Court's recent Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc.25 4 decision, the emphasis on expanded managerial
prerogative is unmistakable. Today, the scope of this prerogative is
far greater than that critiqued by Professor Cary. It now extends to
the market for corporate control thought by Ralph Winter and others
to be both the missing ingredient in Cary's misguided call for federal
action and the unsung vehicle by which shareholder power would
be reclaimed. The two prongs of state corporate law have adroitly
outflanked believers in this brand of market medicine for corporate
ills. By empowering corporate management to short-circuit market
mechanisms, state law has now effectively neutralized the capital
market antidote for its earlier failings.
One can easily launch a searing indictment of this development. 255 In addition to betraying shareholders, states are accused of
sheltering parochial interests and of pandering to corporate management. Besides a massive erosion in shareholder influence, the
results are said to be a substantial diminution of shareholder wealth,
depressed share prices, externalization of costs, throttling of competitive market forces, reduction in the efficiency with which corporate
resources are used, loss of international competitiveness, absence of
genuine protection for local interests, retrograde corporate gover25 6
nance, and a serious lack of managerial accountability.
The responses to these allegations are well-known. 25

1

One claim

still heard, although less frequently than in the past, is that shareholders are now better off because of state law. This claim has both

a descriptive and a normative dimension. Descriptively, this refrain
is a managerial apologist's ironic variation on a theme sung by
market advocates: the current status of law must be beneficial to
shareholders because, over the long run, corporate law itself is the

254. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).

255. After Pennsylvania added several new wrinkles to its already formidable
antitakeover law in .1990, Senator Vincent Fumo labeled it the "Fat Cat Protection

and Shareholder Rip-off Act of 1989." Elias, "Turning Up the Heat on the Top,"
Insight, July 23, 1990, at 8, 9. See generally id. (providing other criticisms of

Pennsylvania's new law).
256. See Cann, Toward The Depoliticization of Takeover Theory: Creation Of An
Innovation Factor, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1167, 1172-77 (1989) (summarizing many

of these arguments). See also Prentice & Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the
"Nancy Reagan Defense": May Target Boards 'Just Say No"? Should They be Allowed
To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377 (1990).
257. See, e.g., Cann, supra note 256, at 1177-81; Prentice & Langmore, supra
note 256. See also supra note 13.
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product of a bargain of sorts. Given institutional shareholder complaints about the status of state law, either the description is wrong
or the parties have yet to "renegotiate" their bargain. The normative
thrust is that if management's defensive power is so awesome, then
it should be deployed to extract higher premiums from hostile bidders.
However appealing that normative justification of positive law was
when management could delay (but not flatly rebuff) hostile overtures,
current law so heavily fortifies management that event-driven auctions, restructurings, and other investor wealth-enhancing measuresm
seem increasingly unlikely. Today, the claim that these statutory and
case law developments therefore are visibly advantageous for shareholders rings hollow.
Moving away from a shareholder-centered standard of appraisal,
state law developments are sometimes applauded for curbing an
unhealthy and destabilizing use of debt to finance corporate acquisitions, freeing corporate management from an excessive focus on
short-run stock price performance (thereby enabling it to manage
enterprises for the longer term), increasing international competitiveness, slowing foreign purchases of American companies, protecting various noninvestor interests, and, in general, "throwing some
sand" into the gears of the takeover mechanism.15
One obvious problem in seeking to settle these conflicting claims
is disagreement over the proper criterion (or criteria) for evaluation.
Using the orthodox metric of shareholder well-being, state corporation
law regulating hostile takeovers fails the grade. Likewise, when strict
management accountability is the calculus. When efficiency in resource use is the measure, however, the evidence is mixed. 260 Some
258. Prentice & Langmore, supra note 256. See also supra note 13.
259. The phrase "throwing some sand" is Professor Tobin's. Plender, Throw
Sand in the Takeover Machine, Fin. Times (London), July 24, 1990, at 18. Concern
over foreign investment in America found expression in the Exon-Florio Amendment
to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). As summarized
by Joseph Reece, the amendment "gives the President the power to suspend,

prohibit or dismantle mergers,
acquisitions and takeovers of United States companies
by foreign investment which threaten 'national security."' Reece, Buyer Beware: The
United States No Longer Wants Foreign Capital to Fund CorporateAcquisitions, 18 DEN.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 279, 281 (1990). As of mid-1990, President Bush had followed
the advice of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a highlevel intef-agency panel, on each of the occasions when a formal inquiry over the
"national security" aspects of a takeover has been held. Riddell & Kehoe, Sale of
U.S. Chip Group to Japanese Wins Backing, Fin. Times (London), July 18, 1990, at
3.
260. See Johnson, 'supra note 7, at 869 n.20, & 884-88.
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economists positively crow about takeovers (and thus against state
law obstacles) while others are highly skeptical of efficiency claims.
As to exorbitant levels of debt, conventional finance wisdom emphasizes caution in reliance on leverage, yet Professor Michael Jensen
asserts that too little debt is the real culprit.2 6 ' On the role of takeovers
in enhancing long-run competitiveness, again both sides claim victory.
With respect to protection for noninvestor interests as a justification
for antitakeover laws, concededly such interests remain subject to
incumbent management discretion and enjoy no fully-developed legislative program for their protection3 62 But, at the same time, those
26
interests regularly join the clamor for protection from hostile bids '
and appreciate the fact that facing a rifle with one bullet (managerial
latitude) is better than facing one with two (hostile bidders as well).
Thus, there is not only a difference of opinion over how the
evidence stacks up in agreed categories, but a deeper sparring over
standards for assessment. The former quarrel can be resolved empirically within the limits of social measurement. The latter dispute
cannot for it represents a rejection of the conventional shareholderwelfare, management-accountability prism for viewing corporate issues in favor of a more heterodox, less easily quantifiable outlook.
It is as if one of two neighbors, who have long tended a plot of
ground together, suddenly decides to farm by organic principles while
the other remains wedded to high doses of herbicides and pesticides.
One claims to value sustainability of the soil while the other cherishes
a higher yield. At this level of controversy, there is no palpably
"right" answer because incommensurable standards are at work.
However important it is that each side remain open to, respectful
of, and instructed by the other's views, it is futile to try to shoehorn
the arguments and data of one party into the normative scheme of
the other.
Today, however tentatively and fumblingly, state law expresses
serious reservations about the social utility of hostile takeover activity.
In doing so, the law mirrors the doubts of society at large, a proper
role of law, corporate or otherwise. 264 Part of the regulatory fallout
is adversity for shareholders. But that fact, however disturbing when

261. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. EcON. REv. 323, 324 (1986).
262. See Cox, supra note 13, at 203-14.
263. See Millon, supra note 16.
264. Johnson, supra note 7, at 934.
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viewed in isolation, clinches nothing, either for social policy or
corporate law, when set into a larger matrix of considerations. Thus,
the claim that in 1991 state corporation law is not fully responsive
to shareholder concerns is not denied, it is duly noted and met with
a "yes, but . .. ."
B.

Responses to State Corporation Law

Only by appreciating a couple of basic points can one answer
the question of what, if anything, should be done about the current
condition of state corporation law. First, empirically, much is still
unknown about the overall effects of hostile takeover activity. Second,
a significant number of responsible persons are saying "yes, but. .... "
Failure to acknowledge these facts will lead to calls for one or more
of the misguided courses of action described in the three subparts
below.
1. Continued Constitutional Challenges to State Antitakeover
Legislation
Like the quest for nuclear fusion, state legislatures feverishly
continue their search for a truly invincible form of antitakeover
legislation. Control share acquisition and business combination statutes, now de riguer, are joined by a remarkable panoply of other
innovative laws. These baroque laws authorize, 265 and sometimes
require, 266 directors to consider noninvestor interests in forming corporate responses to hostile bids; make explicit that shareholder interests are not the primary or controlling factor in managerial decision
making;267 require bidders to honor trade union contracts and make
substantial severance payments to discharged employees;26 authorize
corporations to insulate directors from liability;26 9 make it clear that
directors may refuse to redeem poison pill plans; 270 and oblige shareholders, who have held twenty percent or more of a company's voting

265. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251, subd. 5 (West 1990); OHio REv.
§ 1701.59D (Anderson Supp. 1989).
266. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (Vest 1990).
267. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(0 (Bums Supp. 1990); 1990 PA. LAws 36,
55 2, 4 (amending 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 511(e), 1721(0(3) (Supp. 1990)).
268. 1990 PA. LAws 36, § 6 (adding 55 2581-2583, 2585-2588 to 15 PA. CONS.
CODE ANN.

STAT.).

269. Di.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1974 & Supp. 1988); 1990 PA. LAws
36, § 2 (amending 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 5 512).
270: 1990 PA. LAws 36, § 4 (amending 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1721(F)(1)).
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stock for less than two years, to disgorge to the corporation any
profit on shares sold within eighteen months after the shareholder
first became a twenty percent or more owner.271 Only the limits of
corporate lawyers' imaginations constrain yet additional legislation.
These latest enactments have caused considerable handwringing
among, and have been harshly criticized by, academic commentators,
shareholder advocacy groups, and the recently-resigned General
Counsel of the SEC. 27 2 Moreover, the new chairman of the SEC,
Richard Breeden, has lambasted these laws and asserting a compelling
federal interest in a national market for stocks, menacingly indicating
the SEC may challenge them on constitutional grounds. 273 At least
one corporate scholar believes that a challenge on constitutional
grounds will be successful.2 74 Tough talk is the prerogative of a new
administrative chief.273 But whatever the chairman's beliefs about the
substantive flaws of this legislation, one can only hope his threat of
legal action, issued before the SEC's drubbing in the one-share, onevote case, will be reconsidered as a waste of time and a lost cause.
Failure to do so can only signify an almost conscious blindness to
the fact that, for good or bad, states possess the constitutional power
to pluck attributes of stock to the point that the shareholder is virtually
impotent. The real row should not be over whether they now have
that power, but whether it should be taken from them.
2.

Imposition of One Share, One Vote by Self-Regulatory
Organizations

Invalidation of Rule 19c-4 may lead to voluntary adoption of
a one-share, one-vote pre-condition to trading by the NYSE, AMEX
and NASD. Although the NYSE ignited the voting rights furor in
the first place by proposing to rescind its longstanding policy, it
retained its own one-share, one-vote rule after promulgation of Rule

271. 1990

PA. LAWS

36, S 6 (adding SS 2571-2575 to 15

PA.

CoNs.

STAT.).

272. See Elias, supra note 255; States Acting in Takeover Arena Says SEC General
Counsel, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1389, at 4 (Apr. 18, 1990).
273. Chairman Breeden Addresses Takeovers and Shareholders' Rights, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 1392, at 4-6 (May 7, 1990).
274. Professor Ronald Gilson of Stanford University Law School has stated
that "state regulation of publicly held domestic corporations conflicts with the
commerce clause." Elias, supra note 255, at 15. See also Sidak & Woodward, supra

note 150.
275. Day, Tough Cop at the SEC; Chairman Richard Breeden, in Office a Year,

Aggressively Seeks to Expand Agency's Authority, Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1990, at HI.
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19c-4. Moreover, although the NYSE is understandably concerned
about competitors refusing to adopt such a rule in an effort to capture
listings, the NASD Board of Governors recently adopted a one-share,
one-vote rule.Y6 If the AMEX goes along, it would appear that the
whole voting rights upheaval could be expeditiously resolved and the
1926-1988 era of corporate suffrage be restored. For two reasons,
this would be an unsatisfactory outcome.
First, in light of the one-share, one-vote decision it is far from
dear that a one-share, one-vote rule adopted by self-regulatory organizations will have the force of federal law, as opposed to the
status of a rule imposed by any voluntary association, be it a country
club, fraternal organization or self-regulatory securities organization.
The court rejected the SEC's claim that it had authority to promulgate
the rule under the "otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this
title" language of section 19(c) of the 1934 Act. 27 7 Section 19(b) of
the Act provides that self-regulatory organizations must file their
proposed rules with the SEC. 273 It further provides that the SEC
shall approve the rule, presumably thereby according it the same
legal status as a rule promulgated under section 19(c), if it makes
a finding that the proposal is "consistent with the requirements of
[the Act]." 27 9 If the SEC cannot make such a finding, it shall
28
disapprove the proposed rule. 0
While the language of section 19(b) differs somewhat from section
19(c), it seems likely that if an agency-initiated rule is not in "furtherance of the purposes of this title," then the same self-regulatory
organization-initiated rule is not "consistent with the requirements
of this tide." Under this reading, the SEC must disapprove such
an SRO-sponsored rule. If, on the other hand, such a rule is "consistent" with the "requirements" of the Exchange Act because "consistent" is more neutral and less demanding than "furtherance,"
then all kinds of rules are "consistent" with that Act. In that case,
the SEC could "approve" the rule but the effect of its action on
276. On July 25, 1990, the NASD filed with the SEC a proposed rule change
whereby Part HI, Section 5 of Schedule D of the NASD Bylaws would be amended
to adopt the same prohibitions as were contained in vacated SEC Rule 19c-4. 55
Fed. Reg. 31,465 (1990). The proposed change does not apply to all issuers on
NASDAQ, but only those larger issuers whose stocks are in the NASDAQ. National
Market System. Id. at 31,465 n.5.
277. Burinas Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407.

278. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1982).
279. Id. § 78s(b)(2).
280. Id.
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the status of the rule under federal law is unclear, and would seem
to be different than approval under the "furtherance" standard of
section 19(c).
By bringing rules of the SROs under SEC authority, as it did
by enacting section 19(b), one might argue that Congress has forbidden SROs to impose and enforce rules that are not "consistent
with the requirements of this title." Otherwise, it is not clear what
SEC approval is supposed to add to the rules of voluntary associations.
The inability of the SEC to approve an SRO-proposed one-share,
one-vote rule may mean more than simply regarding SRO rules as
mere policies or conventions that, while lacking the force of federal
law, still must be complied with by issuers. It might mean that those
rules which cannot be approved lack force of any kind. Even if
approved, the status of such rules under federal law is murky.
Were section 19(b) construed otherwise than as argued, SROs
could do voluntarily under that section far more than the SEC could
mandate under section 19(c). For example, they could condition
trading privileges on the agreement of issuers to opt out of antitakeover statutes or to rescind poison pill plans. Those conditions would
invade state corporation law as deeply as the SEC's one-share, onevote rule. Perhaps Congress meant either to "leave" such power in
the hands of SROs (if not the SEC) or to "confer" such power on
SROs notwithstanding the clear aim of drawing those bodies under
the federal regulatory mantle. 21 But it is also a possibility that in
leaving corporate governance with the states, Congress denied do202
minion over such fundamental matters to SROs as well as the SEC.
Second, states have pruned the alienability and voting attributes
of corporate stock because they believe that unfettered exercise of
those powers causes deleterious effects on other important interests.
The states may be dead wrong. But should their collective legislative
decisions be overborne by the views of self-regulatory organizations?
Officials of SROs, like the SEC, may conceive of the one-share,
one-vote issue as simply a matter of restoring integrity to corporate

281. Moreover, the collective exercise of this power by the SROs might raise

an antitrust issue. Compare Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
(no implied revocation of antitrust laws by Exchange Act) with Gordon v. New
York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (implied revocation of antitrust laws by
Exchange Act); Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
282. In the one-share, one-vote decision, the court briefly digresses to take up
the S 19(b)19(c) anomaly. Business Roundlable, 905 F.2d at 414-15. This author
finds its treatment enlightening but not persuasive.
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stock and, therefore, like apple pie, an unquestioned good. Lacking
multiple constituencies or the democratic processes of legislatures,
they may not view erosion of shareholder power as a necessary,
albeit draconian, means to the end of quelling perceived abuses of
takeover practices. Such officials may wonder "What abuses? Takeovers raise trading volume." Debate over problems underlying
perceived abuses never gets started because the vast body of people
adversely affected by corporate activities have no input into the
deliberations of stock trading associations. Even if they did, the
decision-making criteria of those organizations center solely upon
facilitating capital exchanges and enhancing investor protection. Yet,
exaggerated emphasis on those qualities, however laudable in proper
portions and in context, may be the very instrument by which the
alleged disruption wrought by takeovers is accomplished. In this
respect, the range of stock exchange considerations is as narrow as
many prescribe for corporate law. 2 s Finally, ordinary citizens cannot
register disapproval of the potentially enterprise-shaking actions taken
by these officials because these officials are not elected.
At bottom, corporate suffrage in the 1990s is not a dull, obscure
subject to be gratefiflly consigned to those stock exchange officials
who can stomach it. Voting power, and the control over corporate
activity it entails, is inextricably tied to the need of society at large
for a clearer assessment of hostile takeovers and their broader socioeconomic ramifications. It is tied, as well, to the need for extended
discussion of the strength and reach of the claims of capital providers
on corporate activity in a modem society. Consequently, decisions
about voting rights should not be in the hands of those whose
livelihood depends on high levels of trading activity in corporate
stock. The issue should be in the spotlight. It belongs in a legislative
forum.
3.

Federal Intervention

There is little question that, by virtue of the commerce and
supremacy clauses, Congress has the constitutional authority to override state corporation law. Proposals for federal intervention into
corporate governance have been made from time to time throughout
the twentieth century. 28 4 Occasioned by the recurring belief that state

283. See supra text accompanying note 7.

284. &ee Boyer, Federalism and CorporationLaw: Drawing the Line in State Teaor
Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1041-56 (1986).
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law has sunk to new depths, these calls have ranged from modest
tinkering with state law to proposals for a wholesale federal incorporation act. 2 5 They have always failed. Most recently, the 1987
285
decision of the Supreme Court upholding state antitakeover statutes
set off a new clamor for federal action, this time in the form of
287
recommendations for express preemption of state antitakeover laws.
That effort fizzled as well. Now, unless SROs voluntarily act, the
one-share, one-vote decision will rekindle pleas for federal law man2
dating equal voting rights. 88
From the vantage point of corporate law orthodoxy, such appeals
seem compelling and uncontroversial. Who in a political democracy
can demur to equal voting rights, more vibrant corporate governance,
stricter accountability and a reaffirmation of shareholders as the sheet
anchor of corporate life? Framed that way, only a shameless apologist
for despotic managers could dissent. But like other takeover-related
legal issues, the two sides of this specific issue serve as rallying points
for beliefs about the pros and cons of that larger phenomenon. Those
with honest misgivings about the overall value of high levels of hostile
takeover activity are not in principle opposed to equal suffrage,
accountability, and shareholder welfare. They do not, however, assess
those virtues in isolation or regard them as static abstractions. Consequently, they are unwilling to commit unreservedly to those concepts if doing so is not demonstrably, and by some widely acclaimed
measure, the superior course of action in light of the exigencies of
a specific social phenomenon. This reluctance is nothing more than
a desire to keep matters open for discussion until wider consensus
is reached or, short of that, until the source of disruption (here,

285: Id. See supra text and accompanying note 85.
286. See supra text and accompanying notes 200-16 (discussing the holding of

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)).
287. "'There are lots of people who would like to pre-empt these state [takeover]
statutes, but the majority of them are law professors and economists.... That's
not a large enough constituency to encourage strong federal pressure to overturn
what are about 40 state laws."' Sontag, After Ruling, Stricter Law on Mergers?, Nat'l
L.J., July 10, 1989, at 24, col. 4 (quoting Professor John Coffee of Columbia
University School of Law). In 1988, Congress considered preemption, but intense
lobbying by labor unions, the Business Roundtable, and other groups quashed the

subject. See id.
288. See S. 1314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) and H.R. 2783, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985) (two recently proposed one-share, one-vote bills). Recently, Professor
Seligman has renewed the argument for federal minimum corporate-law standards.
Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L.

917 (1990).
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takeover activity) calms down and can be assayed with less passion.
In short, it is a strategy for resolving conflict by prolonging rather
than stifling full-bored debate. Thus it celebrates a proliferation and
diversity of voices and rejects calls for prematurely dosing the book
and imposing uniformity of practice.
This strategy, of course, is the strategy of federalism and it
exists by design, not accident. 28 Accepting that with liberty comes
both a continual disruption of established practices and an understandable quarrelling over how to reorder affairs in light of that
disruption, it resists forced adherence to enlightened orthodoxy (from
whatever point on the political spectrum) and instead encourages
experimentation while expecting (and tolerating) errors.? Unless one
believes that the machinery of state governments has simply broken
down, one can view developments in state corporation law in this
fashion. Certain of these laws do offend venerable precepts and engage
in a bit of overkill, while others are just downright puzzling. Moreover, if, as appears to be the case, takeover activity does subside,
a mechanism for withdrawing (or reconsidering) those provisions
which were inspired by, and aimed specifically at, takeovers is sadly
lacking. Now being law, they may remain so for quite some time,
and with implications unrelated to the dislocations caused by hostile
takeovers. Acknowledging these defects, state law should not be
displaced, unless particular corporate governance notions, however
seemingly crucial, are so fundamental as to be more important than
preservation of state government as a forum for differentiated responses to contemporary problems (not to mention a viable counterforce to the awesome power of the federal government). Moreover,
within corporate law there is strong evidence of a genuine, if episodic
and incomplete, grappling with notions that once seemed settled.
This struggling would truly be academic and futile were federal law
first to brand state lawmaking as deviant and renegade, and then
to quash it.

289. This subpart has been influenced by John Kincaid's recent article on
federalism. See Kincaid, Federalism and Communiy in the American Context, 20 Puauus
69 (1990).
290. Alexis de Tocqueville noted the frustration that attends deference to local
governments: "A very civilized society finds it hard to tolerate attempts at freedom
in a local community; it is disgusted by its numerous blunders and is apt to despair
of success before the experiment is finished." 1 A. ToCQuEvtuL,
Dv.-ocACY IN
AME icA 62 (J. Mayer ed. 1969). A better statement of frustration over the devolution
of political power in today's Soviet Union would be hard to find.
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Rethinking of core corporate law ideas is taking place by academics, practicing lawyers, business persons, and government officials, all of whom deserve an initial presumption of acting in good
faith. At the same time, as the legal pendulum swings toward expansive managerial prerogative, these persons must be prepared to
say how shareholders and noninvestors can be assured that such
prerogative will be exercised responsibly. Bearing in mind this latter
challenge, I list but a small sampling of intriguing ideas now afoot
in corporate law:
1. Perhaps product and service markets in an increasingly international economy constrain and discipline corporate management
more reliably than the market for corporate control.
2. Perhaps takeovers do not invariably create more efficient
2

91

enterprises.
3. Perhaps share prices do not represent intrinsic enterprise

92
values or accurately predict acquisition outcomes.
4. Perhaps greater managerial accountability to shareholders does
not yield better corporate performance or international competitive-

ness.

293

5. Perhaps managerial accountability to shareholders is not as

294
important as sometimes thought.

291. Extensive evidence in both the United States and the United Kingdom
casts doubt on the efficiency outcomes of hostile acquisitions. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 256, at 448-51 nn.362-71 (U.S. data); Fortier, Hostile Takeovers
and the Marketfor Corporate Control, Econ. Persp., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 2, 12 ("Research
does not provide clear support for the hypothesis that there are real efficiency gains
from takeovers .... Only with additional research can the social and economic
welfare implications and policy directives regarding hostile takeovers be more precisely drawn.") John Plender describes the United Kingdom experience: "A recent
Department of Trade and Industry study also highlighted the consistency with which
academic work found either that takeovers failed to generate efficiency gains or that
the evidence was inconclusive." Plender, supra note 259, at 18.
292. See, e.g., Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990).
293. SEC Commissioner Philip R. Lochner, Jr. recently stated that an assumption which needs to be examined is that "shareholder accountability equals
good management." Commissioner Lochner Raises Questions Concerning Prox Reform,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1400, at 1 (June 21, 1990). Commissioner Lochner
also questioned the factual basis for assertions that increased corporate democracy
will enhance international competitiveness. Id. at 2.
294. Id. at 1-2; Coffee, supra note 7 (bilateral view of corporate governance
ignores interests of stakeholders).
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6. Perhaps electing corporate directors only every five years will
lead to better financial performance.2 5
7. Perhaps hostile takeovers should be banned or subjected to
merit review.2
8. Perhaps other criteria for evaluating the usefulness of hostile
297
takeovers are needed.
9. Perhaps shareholder primacy is a less commanding concept
today than earlier.2
10. Perhaps other organizational, governance and owmership
structures will evolve and flourish.3

295.. Lipton, An End to Hostile Takeovers and Shwrt-Tennrism: Corporate Gorernance,
Fin. Times (London), June 27, 1990, at 21 (arguing that the present system forces
corporate management to focus on short-term performance and results, and that a
"five-yearly system would permit corporations to pursue long-term planning without
fear that investment in research and development, plant and equipment, expanding
markets and similar short-term depressants on earnings would result in a takeover").
Id.
296. Trevor, Hostile Takeovers: A U.S. Falkiand Islands Where the Argentines Al,,ays
Win, in HosrLE TAKaEnovs: ISSUES IN PUnUC AND CORPORATr PoucY 16 (D.
McKee ed. 1989) (proposing Abolition of Tender Offers Act); Morrissey, Safeguarding
the Public Interest in Leveraged Buyouts, 69 OR. L. REv. 47 (1990) (proposing merit
review of leveraged buyouts by SEC). These two proposals are interesting but
require federal intervention of a kind this author believes to be both unnecessary
and fraught with the usual dangers of reliance on solutions from a central authority.
297. e Cann, supra note 256, at 1209 (advocating innovation as the key
criterion).
298. e supra note 7.
299. Worker ownership of businesses, especially through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), is one such arrangement that has generated recent interest.
See Hansmann, W/zen Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Finns, Coderminalion,
and Economic Democracy, 99 YA LJ. 1749 (1990). The question of share ownership
is a key issue in the privatization of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern
Europe. In August 1990, this author travelled to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland with a delegation of American securities lawyers to meet with government
officials of those countries about this transformation of ownership. At this time,
the plan is to convert state-owned enterprises into joint stock companies. This step
is relatively uncontroversial. The next step is to sell or otherwise distribute the
shares of stock in those companies. How this will be done is somewhat controversial.
In Czechoslovakia, for example, officials at the Federal Ministry of Finance are
considering a plan whereby every citizen of the federation will receive the opportunity
(via voucher) to be given one share of stock. Conversation with Jan Tauber, adviser
to the Czechoslovakia Federal Ministry of Finance, August 27, 1990. At the end
of the process, the citizenry at large will own 20% of the capital stock of the
formerly state-owned enterprises, and transfers of that stock will be prohibited for
a period of time (perhaps one year). Id. In Poland, by way of contrast, current
plans call for distributing up to 20% of the state-owned enterprises (as converted
into joint stock companies) to the employees of those companies. Conversation with
Dr. Gregory Domanski, Professor of Law, Warsaw University, August 29, 1990.
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Calls for federal intervention to overturn (or preempt) one or
more provisions of state law (whether allowance of unequal voting
rights or other practices) are claims that certain matters are settled
and that uniformity of practice is a must. The "opening" of corporate
law to deal with the several ideas listed above suggests those claims
are more wishes than descriptions of fact. Today, those claims also
often contrast the patchwork of American corporation law (as well
as securities, insurance, and banking law) with European movement
toward greater coordination and economic, and possibly political,
unification. 3 00 From a comparative perspective, the suggestion seems
to be that European nations will continue to relinquish "sovereignty"
over vast areas of commercial activity, including sole control over
currencies. The clear implication is that Western Europe is progressing while America is caught in a retrograde time warp. Alarmed

by the specter of slippage in world stature, Americans are urged to
heed the call for commercial and regulatory uniformity as an indispensable plank in the platform for economic well-being, even survival. 01
This comparison is beguiling but naive. Although the United
States is a mere youth compared to older European nations, we are
considerably more advanced in our experience with wide scale free
enterprise and capitalism. There is no reason to think the answers
to certain economic questions (here, precisely what attributes should
attach to corporate stock) will be the same in mature capitalist societies
as in those just getting under way. °2 Ironically, the Western capitalism that Europe strives to emulate may be softening at the edges,
not because we do not still believe in it, but because we have had
longer experience with it. This irony is born of experience, however,
not ideology, and so it adds a distressing tincture for those who like
their legal and political doctrine pure.

The workers will have the option to buy additional shares at a 50% discount for
a period of one year. Id. The Polish Parliament may also issue vouchers to the
citizenry at large, thereby entitling each citizen to acquire stock, whether or not
an employee of the particular enterprise. Id. See also Bobinski, Poles Will be Given
Large Share of State Industries, Fin. Times (London), Sept. 7, 1990, at 6.
300. SEC Chairman Richard Breeden recently compared what he called the
"balkanization" of American regulatory law with European efforts to eliminate
barriers to cross-border transactions. Supra note 273, at 5-6. See also supra notes 910.
301. See supra notes 9-10.
302. See supra note 299 (proposed share ownership plans in Central Europe).
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That demands on corporations are increasing in this country,
and thereby tempering shareholder claims, is a sign that mature
market economies (and the institutions operating within them) are
complex and must take seriously the social, environmental and moral
boundaries (and failings) of markets3st So doing is not to understate
the enormous value of lively markets and capitalism in unleashing
human potential but is to attend more consciously to checking their
shortcomings and excesses. This may lead to a rethinking and whittling back of certain conventions, but it does not signify a deviation
from the capitalist path. It represents a healthy examination of private
ownership as an evolving, flexible notion with an irrepressible social
and moral dimension. s° It sees competition itself as a banded or
"encapsulated" phenomenon having free reign within a province the
size and shape of which is demarcated by shifting laws, normative
values and social bonds. 30 5
To encourage rethinking of current practices is, of course, to
run the risk of mistakes and to live with an untidy eclecticism. But
the alternative is imposition of drab conformity by a central authority.
Even when sweetened by the better-sounding names of consistency
and harmony, and even when done to achieve unfettered markets,
the imposition of standard behavior from on high, so as to override
inferior governments, may weaken state bodies as suppliers of competing legal regimes and stifle them (and other civic associations) as
mediators between a powerful central government and the individual. 3 06 Paradoxically, by invoking the legal monopoly power of the

303. See Etzioni, EncapsulatedCompetition, 7J. Posr-KEuNvsi EcoN. 287 (1985)
(describing how ethical precepts, social bonds, and government support work together
to "encapsulate" competition within socially set limits). This article appears in
somewhat modified and expanded form in A. ETziom, THE MORAL D=NsiON:
TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988).

304. If centrally-planned command economies of the kind seen in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe truly are relics of the past, new attention to the moral

dimension of their polar opposite, capitalistic market-driven economies, can be
expected and should be welcomed. See Johnson, 7he Capitalism & Moraliy Debate,
1 FIRST THmIGS 18 (1990) (providing one view of this vital issue). Discussion of
this issue is just getting under way in Great Britain as well. Longley, 277L Business
of Investing in Faith, The Times (London), Mar. 17, 1990, at 12 (describing recent
exchanges about the moral dimension of capitalism between business and Church
of England leaders).

305. See Etzioni, supra note 303.
306. Professor Nisbet uses the term "intermediation" to describe the role of
those groups intermediate to the individual and central governmental authority.
Nisbet, The Present Age And The State Of Community, Chronicles (June 1988) at 11,
17.
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highest governmental authority, the craving for uniform market solutions to economic problems rids the political arena of competition.
This paradox haunts Ralph Winter's analysis and all models that
hold market activity to be somehow truly independent of public
action. Moreover, the disdain for messy, democratic, decentralized
responses to the complexities of social transformation marks this
craving as countermajoritarian in its impulses.

Furthermore, when the rhetoric is punctured, one sees that the
nations of Europe are also debating some of the same issues. 07 True,
directives lowering trade barriers in the EC are spilling out of Brussels
at a fast clip in the run-up to 1992. But progress on currency reform
has stalled, and serious debate on what political unification really
means, viz, a genuinely supra-national government is farfetched, has
hardly begun. As to corporate law matters, the European Commission, after seventeen years, passed breakthrough merger legislation.308
But with less fanfare than some of the exciting border-dropping
measures, the European Commission is also now working on several
directives comprising the social charter of worker rights, 309 including
that well-known feature of the European corporate landscape workers'
councils. 310 With strong social democratic traditions, not to mention
markedly different institutional arrangements for share ownership, 31'
it can be expected that free movement of capital will not trump all
other interests and that European nations will be as alert to the social

307. See, e.g., A.

COSH,

A. HUGHES, A.

TAKEOVERS AND SHORT-TERMISM IN THE UK

SINGH,

J.

CARTY

& J.

PLENDER,

(Industrial Policy Paper 3, Institute

for Public Policy Research 1990).
308. See supra note 10.
309. The first of these directives are now being released. See, e.g., Commission
Proposes Regulation of Working Hours, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCHI), Aug. 16, 1990
at 2. Soon, the EC Commission will issue a plethora of pipposals. See, e.g., Buchan,
The EuropeanMarket; EC Set to Renew the Battle Over Social Polic, Fin. Times (London),
Sept. 3, 1990, at 4. See generally Bercusson, The European Community's Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 53 MOD. L. REv. 624 (1990); Hepple, The
Implementation of the Community Charter of FundamentalSocial Rights, 53 MOD. L. REV.

643 (1990).
310. Kellaway, Brussels Directive Would Force EC Employers to Consult Workers,
Fin. Times (London), Dec. 5, 1990, at 3, cols. 1, 2.
311. In France and Italy, for example, the state still owns many business
enterprises. In West Germany, banks own large blocks of stock in many companies.
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ramifications of cross-border acquisitions as any state in this country.112 In the mixed economy of West Germany (and Japan in Asia),
now the envy of other countries, hostile takeovers are virtually unknown, so they can hardly be viewed as the sine qua non of prosperity.
And if the European Community is broadened to include countries
of yet different traditions, such as the massive liberal welfare states
of Scandinavia (not to mention the countries of Central Europe) the
resistance to pure capital market directives will further stiffen. The
precise blending of free enterprise capitalism and social democratic
practices is yet to unfold. But that it will be a blending there can
be little doubt.
V.

CONCLUSION

For both European nations and the United States, corporate
law issues such as equal voting rights are inescapably bound up with
larger social currents. Notions like investor confidence, efficiency,
and liquidity, because they have been somewhat downgraded by
states, must be assessed in a markedly broader and richer context,
particularly as institutional investors reassert their voice in corporate
affairs and talk turns to federal proxy reform. Historical, as well as
cross-cultural, practice is one useful, but not dispositive, guide in
this fledgling effort. As things now stand, however, one thing is
dear: states occupy the position they have held all along in our
country. They are sovereign over corporate stock. It is the furor
caused by their exercise of that enduring sovereignty that, in the
1990s, has provoked renewed attention to fundamental matters. Now
is the time to sustain that awareness, not shut it off.
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